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ABSTRACT
The application of Bayesian networks within the field of institutional research is explored
through the development of a Bayesian network used to predict first- to second-year retention of
undergraduates. A hybrid approach to model development is employed, in which formal
elicitation of subject-matter expertise is combined with machine learning in designing model
structure and specification of model parameters. Subject-matter experts include two academic
advisors at a small, private liberal arts college in the southeast, and the data used in machine
learning include six years of historical student-related information (i.e., demographic,
admissions, academic, and financial) on 1,438 first-year students. Netica 5.12, a software
package designed for constructing Bayesian networks, is used for building and validating the

model. Evaluation of the resulting model’s predictive capabilities is examined, as well as
analyses of sensitivity, internal validity, and model complexity. Additionally, the utility of using
Bayesian networks within institutional research and higher education is discussed.
The importance of comprehensive evaluation is highlighted, due to the study’s inclusion
of an unbalanced data set. Best practices and experiences with expert elicitation are also noted,
including recommendations for use of formal elicitation frameworks and careful consideration of
operating definitions. Academic preparation and financial need risk profile are identified as key
variables related to retention, and the need for enhanced data collection surrounding such
variables is also revealed. For example, the experts emphasize study skills as an important
predictor of retention while noting the absence of collection of quantitative data related to
measuring students’ study skills. Finally, the importance and value of the model development
process is stressed, as stakeholders are required to articulate, define, discuss, and evaluate model
components, assumptions, and results.
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A BAYESIAN APPROACH, EXPERT ELICITATION, AND BAYESIAN

NETWORKS AS APPLICABLE TO INSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH: A REVIEW OF
THE LITERATURE
While applications of a Bayesian approach to statistics are commonly practiced in a
number of fields, examples of studies addressing and incorporating Bayesian statistics in
educational research are less common. Narrowing the field of interest to institutional research,
defined by Saupe (1990) as “research conducted within an institution of higher education to
provide information that supports institutional planning, policy formation and decision making”
(p.1), a Bayesian approach to research offers a tool box rich in resources for handling and
modeling the uncertainty, complexity, and uniqueness of institutional data while also providing a
formal mechanism for incorporating institutional memory, expertise, and prior data into analysis.
With an eye towards the completion of a Bayesian research study within the field of institutional
research, this manuscript provides a comprehensive review of the literature surrounding a
Bayesian approach to institutional research. Beginning with a background of general Bayesian
statistics, the review also discusses the elicitation of subjective probabilities and development
and use of Bayesian networks.
Guiding Questions
The guiding questions shaping this review are as follows: How is a Bayesian approach
relevant to institutional research? How can an institutional researcher leverage and incorporate
expert information and experience into data analysis and modeling? How can Bayesian
networks be used in institutional research, particularly those that predict an outcome of interest?
1

Introduction to Bayesian Statistics
A Bayesian approach to statistics is one in which statisticians attempt to describe a true
state or event in probabilistic terms. Contrary to the classical or frequentist approach in which
probability is defined as the proportion of successful outcomes to number of attempts, Bayesian
statistics views probability as degree of belief. In other words, Bayesian probability is a measure
of the degree of belief in the probability of specific outcome. This degree of belief represents
prior knowledge pertaining to the likelihood of an event, which is then updated with data
relevant to this event in order to form a new, or posterior, belief in the probability of the same
event occurring. As Gill (2009) wrote, “Bayesians generally interpret probability as ‘degree of
belief,’ meaning that prior distributions are descriptions of relative likelihoods of events based on
the researcher’s past experience, personal intuition, or expert opinion, and posterior distributions
are those prior distributions updated by conditioning on new observed data” (p.135).
The following sections address the core tenets of Bayesian inferential methods, including
an explanation of Bayes’ theorem and its role in the function of combining observed data with
prior knowledge, a discussion of the prior distribution and how it is formed, and consideration of
model fit. Discussion of arguments surrounding the subjectivity of the Bayesian approach is also
included, as well as a summary of the advantages and limitations of Bayesian methods,
particularly within the context of social sciences, and educational and institutional research.
Bayes’ Theorem
Fundamentally, Bayesian methods provide a way to revise probabilities by incorporating
new data. Equation 1.1 demonstrates Bayes’ theorem, in which the probability of event B given
event A (the new data) is modeled as a function of the probability of event A given event B
multiplied by the probability of event B alone and divided by the probability of event A.
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𝑝𝑝(𝐵𝐵|𝐴𝐴) =

𝑝𝑝(𝐴𝐴|𝐵𝐵)𝑝𝑝(𝐵𝐵)
𝑝𝑝(𝐴𝐴)

(1.1)

Medical testing is commonly used as an illustrative tool when describing Bayes’ theorem.
Consider an example provided by Gigerenzer (2002) concerning the efficacy of mammogram
testing for breast cancer. Within Gigerenzer’s example, it is presented that .8% of women in the
general population have breast cancer. The probability that a woman with breast cancer receives
a positive mammogram is 90%, while the probability that a woman without breast cancer
receives a positive mammogram is 7%. An accurate calculation of the probability that a woman
with a positive mammogram actually has cancer necessitates the inclusion of all of the
information presented: The incidence of breast cancer in the study’s population (.8%), the
probability of a correct mammogram test (90%), and the probability of an incorrect test (7%).
For simplicity, first consider the given information in terms of frequencies (rather than
probabilities and percentages) as presented in Table 1.1:
Table 1.1
Mammogram/Breast Cancer Frequency Table

Mammogram Result
Total

Positive
Negative

Cancer?
Yes
7
1
8

Total
No
70
922
992

77
923
1000

As Table 1.1 shows, .8% (8/1000) of women in the population actually have cancer. Of
those eight women, 88% (7/8) will receive a positive mammogram. Seven percent of the
remaining women in the population (70/992) will also receive a positive mammogram even
though they don’t have cancer. Therefore, a total of 77 women (seven of the women who
actually do have cancer and 70 of the women who do not have cancer) will receive a positive
mammogram. Importantly, only seven of these 77 women actually have cancer, meaning that
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the probability of actually having breast cancer after receiving a positive mammogram is only
9% (7/77).
This information is easily transferred into the variables presented in Bayes’ theorem.
Consider p(B│A) to represent the probability of breast cancer given a positive mammogram.
Bayes’ theorem requires that in order to determine the probability of breast cancer given a
positive mammogram, the overall probability of breast cancer within the population, p(B) or
.8%, be multiplied against the probability of a positive mammogram given the presence of breast
cancer, p(A│B) or 90%, and divided by the overall probability of a positive mammogram, p(A)
or 8%. Substitution of these values into Bayes’ theorem results in a 9% chance that a woman
receiving a positive mammogram actually has breast cancer. Essentially, Bayes’ incorporation
of the known prevalence of cancer within the given population along with test accuracy and
sensitivity act to produce a probability of cancer given a positive mammogram. In order words,
a Bayesian approach investigates how the probability of one event is affected by the probability
of another – conditional probability.
This incorporation of conditional probability is a critical factor in Bayesian methods.
Using the same mammogram example for illustration, there are two conditional probabilities –
the probability of breast cancer given a positive mammogram, p(B│A), and the probability of a
positive mammogram given the presence of breast cancer, p(A│B). The known prevalence of
breast cancer in the general population, p (B), is termed a “prior” probability. The conditional
probability of a positive mammogram given the presence of cancer, p(A│B), is termed
“likelihood” and introduces the incorporation of new information (a positive mammogram) into
consideration. In other words, the likelihood portion of Bayes’ theorem estimates the effect of a
positive mammogram on a prior belief that a person has breast cancer. However, the
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mammogram’s test sensitivity and accuracy are also considered in the equation, as reflected in
the divisor. The overall probability of receiving a positive mammogram, p (A), is a function of
the test’s accuracy (in terms of the probability of false positive) and the test’s sensitivity (in
terms of probability of cancer detection given the presence of cancer), both of which are
tempered by the known prevalence (prior) of breast cancer. The product of the prior and
likelihood is considered the “posterior probability.” Using Gigerenzer’s (2002) mammogram
example, Table 1.2 illustrates the components used in Bayes’ theorem to estimate the posterior
probability of breast cancer given a positive mammogram.
Table 1.2
Components of Bayes Theorem, Using Gigerenzer’s (2002) Mammogram Example
Posterior
Prior Probability
Likelihood
Probability
p(B│A)
p (B)
p (Bno cancer )
p(A│B)
p(A│Bno cancer) p(A)
Probability of
breast cancer
given positive
mammogram
=

Breast
cancer
prevalence
in
population

Probability of
not having
breast cancer in
general
population

Probability
of positive
mammogram
given breast
cancer

Probability of
positive
mammogram
given no breast
cancer (false
positive)

Probability of
receiving
positive
mammogram:
= (90% * .8%) +
(99.2% * 7%)

.8%

99.2%

90%

7%

8%

𝑝𝑝(𝐴𝐴|𝐵𝐵)𝑝𝑝(𝐵𝐵)
𝑝𝑝(𝐴𝐴)

90%∗.8%

=

9%

8%

Without the information provided by the mammogram, and holding all other risk factors
constant, the only way to estimate the probability of breast cancer is to simply quote the
prevalence within the general population. Bayes’ theorem allows for the introduction of the new
mammogram information (including allowances for the mammogram’s sensitivity and accuracy,
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in terms of false negatives and false positives) to adjust the prior belief and form a more accurate
understanding of the probability of breast cancer given a positive mammogram. Understanding
of the theorem and its components also allows for a more accurate assessment of what a positive
mammogram really implies – without considering the actual prevalence of breast cancer in the
general population, as well as the test’s sensitivity and accuracy, one would mistakenly interpret
a positive mammogram as a 90% chance that the patient has cancer. Incorporating all the
information available reveals only a 9% chance that a patient with a positive mammogram has
breast cancer. The incorporation of new information is a major factor of what sets the Bayesian
approach apart from frequentist techniques.
Bayesian Priors
Another major difference between Bayesian and frequentist approaches involves the use
of Bayesian priors. Put most simply, a Bayesian prior is a quantification of the researcher’s a
priori beliefs. In the previous example, the incidence of breast cancer in the population served as
the prior probability. Although there is much variation in the literature regarding nomenclature,
Bayesian priors can be broadly categorized as uninformative or informative. Within these
categories are a number of subcategories, often depending on the weight assigned and source of
the prior knowledge. The following sections provide a general discussion of these two broad
categories of priors. More in depth discussion of the philosophical interpretations of
probabilities that form the foundation of these priors follows.
Uninformative priors. Uninformative priors (also termed “objective,”
“noninformative,” “flat,” “vague,” “diffuse,” and “reference,” among others, in the literature)
provide little additional information or explanatory power, and are often employed to reflect
objectivity (Gill, 2009). Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin (2004) suggested that the use of
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uninformative prior distributions is a way “to let the data speak for themselves” (p. 62), thereby
limiting, or even eliminating any influence of prior information on current data and posterior
distributions. Uninformative priors are also used in the case when more subjective prior
distributions are unavailable or when resources involved with gathering prior information is
deemed prohibitive (Ghosh, 2011).
The uninformative prior employed by the earliest Bayesians is the uniform prior, in
which all possible outcomes are equally likely (Bayes, 1763; Laplace, 1825/1902; Syversveen,
1998). In response to the uniform distribution’s problems with lack of invariance (variation in
posterior distributions resulting from non-linear transformations of the same uniform
distribution), Jeffreys (1961) proposed a prior that is invariant under reparameterization and
incorporates Fisher’s information (Data & Ghosh, 1996). Box and Tiao (1973), Lindley (1965),
Press (1972), and Zellner (1971) expanded on Jeffrey’s work, demonstrated Bayesian methods’
ability to more efficiently address statistical problems, and set the stage for an extensive amount
of literature exploring uninformative or objective priors (Bernardo, 2005).
The concept of a “reference prior,” or a prior whose influence is subjugated to
information provided by the data, is an important form of uninformative prior that emerged from
these discussions (Berger & Bernardo, 1992). Importantly, reference priors are understood to
represent formal, consensus-driven functions developed among a scientific community, ensuring
“that the information provided by the data will not be overshadowed by the scientist’s prior
beliefs” (Bernardo, 2005, p. 3). This understanding of uninformative priors as providing
minimal impact is also an important distinction from earlier ideas that uninformative priors are
attempts to represent or express ignorance (Kass & Wasserman, 1996). One special case of
uninformative priors, and one that results in posterior probabilities requiring careful
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interpretation, is an “improper” prior, or one which the sum of all possible values specified by
the prior distribution does not result in a finite value (Gelman at al., 2004).
In the past fifty years, discussion of uninformative priors has dramatically expanded
beyond uniform and Jeffrey’s priors. Yang and Berger (1997) provided a catalog of
uninformative priors, while Kass and Wasserman (1996) offered a comprehensive guide to the
selection of the many types of uninformative priors. The large amount of literature focused on
the methods behind and selection of uninformative priors points toward a search for a default or
generally agreed-upon uninformative prior that will address concerns of objectivity.
Informative priors. Informative priors intentionally include knowledge designed to
influence posterior probabilities and, ultimately, statistical inference. Press (2003) outlined the
advantages of informative priors as follows: Such priors are proper, act as supplementary data,
capitalize on expert knowledge, and present an avenue for analysis when other information
(“objective” Bayesian priors, or even a frequentist approach) is unavailable.
Informative priors can be derived from a number of sources, often including previous
studies and results, researcher expertise, subject-matter expertise, and mathematical convenience
(Gill, 2009; Gelman et al., 2004). For example, Ibrahim and Chen’s (2000) “Power Prior” is a
form of informative prior built from historical data, in which the influence of the historical data
is weighted based on the researcher’s belief in how closely the historical data can be tied to
current data and inferences. This type of informative prior is most popular in clinical settings, as
there are often large amounts of historical data available. A conjugate prior is an informative
prior chosen due to its conjugacy (same distribution families) with the likelihood function, the
use of which simplifies the calculations necessary to compute a posterior (Raiffa & Schlaifer,
1961). Note that the development of Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques has eased
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the computational burden on statisticians when dealing with non-conjugate priors (Hahn, 2006).
In following sections, this manuscript will address the formal elicitation of subject-matter
expertise in order to develop informative priors.
Other priors. The literature include a number of other prior forms that do not fall neatly
into the “informative” or “uninformative” categories, most of which were developed in the
interest of increasing flexibility and applicability. For example, hybrid priors combine
informative and uninformative priors for use in hierarchical Bayesian models (Gill, 2009).
Jaynes (1980) developed maximum entropy priors in an effort to increase flexibility in
describing comparative levels of uncertainty. Nonparametric-priors were developed to respond
to problems of determining appropriate model complexity (Gershman & Blei, 2012).
Prior Evaluation
Although the sources of priors often depend on a researcher’s judgment, they should not
be chosen cavalierly. Gill (2009) encouraged explicit explanations of prior choice and
specification, as well as analyses of a resulting model’s sensitivity to changes in the chosen prior.
Reimherr, Meng, and Nicolae (2014) further emphasized the importance of evaluating the impact
of an informative prior on the posterior distribution. In other words, it is important to measure
how much prior knowledge influences inferences and conclusions. Additionally, the literature
has suggested model checking (comparing observed data with model-generated data) regardless
of informative or uninformative prior (Evans & Moshonov, 2006; Gelman, Meng, & Stern, 1996;
Kelly & Smith, 2011; Rubin, 1984). For example, as Rubin pointed out, the sensitivity of
conclusions to how a Bayesian model is set up exposes scientific uncertainty – if inferences
change based on model specifications, researchers can conclude that more information and study
is necessary to address the uncertainty revealed. In another form of sensitivity analysis, Berger

9

(2006) recommended a comparison of conclusions drawn from a subjective Bayesian analysis
against those of an objective prior analysis, noting that large differences due to choice of priors
should be discussed and further investigated and justified. Speigelhalter and Rice (2009),
succinctly summarized the evaluative process: “In particular, audiences should ideally fully
understand the contribution of the prior distribution to the conclusions, the reasonableness of the
prior assumptions, the robustness to alternative models and priors, and the adequacy of the
computational methods” (p. 5230).
The incorporation of prior knowledge is a critical advantage of Bayesian methodology.
As Gill (2009) wrote, “priors are a means of systematically incorporating existing human
knowledge, quantitative or qualitative, into the statistical specification” (p. 138). Ultimately, the
selection of prior is based on a number of factors, including research question, availability of
data, and the researcher’s experience. More broadly, the decision of a researcher to employ
Bayesian methodology has much to do with her interpretation of probability. A frequentist
interpretation of probability concludes that the results of long-run, controlled, and repeated
experiments can eventually be interpreted as representative of the short term as well. However,
these types of experiments can be cost prohibitive and time consuming, and are typically
unrealistic within behavioral and social sciences. The Bayesian approach to probability offers an
alternative in which probability represents a degree of belief, and prior probabilities reflect this
degree of belief a priori to any new evidence. As discussed in depth below, this degree of belief
is also termed “subjective probability.”
Subjective Probability
At the root of any discussion regarding the use of Bayesian inferential techniques lies the
idea of subjective probability. In their discussions of the philosophical foundations of
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probability, both Weatherford’s (1982) and Gillies’ (2000) definitions of subjective probability
are remarkably similar: Weatherford defined subjective probability as “the degree of belief of a
given person at a given time” (p. 220), and Gillies stated that subjective probability theory
“identifies probability with the degree of belief of a particular individual” (p. 1). These
definitions are mostly based on the work of subjective theorist Bruno de Finetti, who provided
the philosophical and mathematical groundwork for subjective probability with his definition of
probability as “a measure of a degree of belief attributed to the various possible alternatives” (de
Finetti, 1972, p. 147-148). Further, de Finetti proposed the modification of degree of belief
should be the result of observation of prior events – in short, learning from experience (Cifarelli
& Regazzini, 1996). Subjective probability was further explored through the work of Kyburg
and Smokler (1964), Luce and Suppes (1965), Ramsey (1931), Savage (1954), and Savage,
Hacking, and Shimony (1967).
It is important to note that de Finetti’s and others’ concept of subjective probability was
not without limits. de Finetti likened the limitation of degree of belief to a gambling situation –
“…the degree of probability attributed by an individual to a given event is revealed by the
conditions under which he would be disposed to bet on that event” (de Finetti, 1937/1964, p.
101). Additionally, de Finetti included discussion of the necessary conditions under which
degrees of belief could serve as probabilities: Degrees of belief are measurable and coherent, or
rational, ensuring a grounding in reality (Weatherford, 1982). Other philosophers have
expounded on the circumstances necessary for, and influencing, degrees of belief. Like de
Finetti, Ramsey (1931) employed gambling allusions (avoidance of falling victim to a Dutch
Book, in which a better irrationally agrees to a bet in which he is guaranteed to lose) to illustrate
how adherence to the axioms of probability is critical in determining and acting on degree of
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belief. Bonjour (1985), Dawid (1982), and Lewis (1946) put forth that, in the instance of two or
more pieces of information being used to form a belief, confidence in that belief increases
according the congruence, or coherence, of the pieces of information. In their discussion of the
epistemology underlying the use of probabilities in Bayesian methods, Bovens and Hartmann
(2003) proposed three conditions thought to influence degree of belief: The degree to which the
information forming the belief was expected, the reliability of the information, and the coherence
of the information. In summary, while emphasizing the personalistic and subjective properties of
probability, subjective theorists recognize the necessity of coherency and consistency in the
formation of belief.
Within the realm of Bayesian statistical methods of inference, subjective probability is
important when considering the initial probability assigned to a hypothesis (the Bayesian prior).
As discussed in earlier sections of this manuscript, a researcher using Bayesian inference first
establishes a belief surrounding the probability of an event occurring, and then uses available
data to update that prior probability and form a posterior probability. Recall that there are
generally two types of priors – uninformative and informative – and that uninformative priors are
typically considered “objective.” It can be argued that an informative prior can be considered
fundamentally subjective, as it represents a degree of belief given current and situational
knowledge, experience, reasoning, and logic. The subjective properties of the prior belief sound
very similar to the ideas behind constructivism and phenomenology, such as the understanding
that reality is constructed and meaning is made through individuals’ first-person experiences and
interactions with others (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007). Curlette (2006) suggested that this places
Bayesian methods incorporating a subjective prior belief within a phenomenological framework.
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This use of subjective priors introduces a controversial aspect of Bayesian methodology – the
conflict over subjectivity.
Objectivity vs. Subjectivity
Arguments concerning the roles of objectivity and subjectivity within scientific research
are not uncommon – for example, consider the qualitative versus quantitative “Paradigm Wars”
in educational research (Eisner & Peshkin, 1990; Gage, 1989; Guba, 1990). A criticism of
Bayesians’ acceptance of subjective probability is that it defies the fundamental objectivity
embraced by the mainstream understanding of the scientific method. In his article, The Case for
Objective Bayesian Analysis (2006), Berger acknowledged the fact that statistical methods are
understood to be a tool for producing unbiased, objective validation of scientific results, and
proposes that wider acceptance and valuation of Bayesian methods is predicated on the
appearance of objectivity, particularly within a regulatory climate. The vast amount of literature
and studies addressing the choices of uninformative priors (see “Background – Uninformative
Priors”) speaks to this drive to legitimate Bayesian methodology through a focus on “objective”
priors. There are even attempts to propose more objective informative priors. For example,
Berger and Sun (2008) recommended a set of informative priors that, based on parameters of
interest, can be used as default priors – prescriptive/standardized priors given the research
question. Some would suggest that these prescriptive priors remove any researcher bias or
subjectivity in the actual choice of prior (Lenk & Orme, 2009).
However, it can also be argued that, regardless of approach, there is no such thing as pure
objectivity – researchers’ choices regarding research questions, methodologies, and analysis
techniques could all be considered subjective choices influenced by experience, habit, etc.
(Berger, 2006; Gill, 2009; Hennig, 2009; Press & Tanur, 2001; Stevens & O’Hagan, 2002;
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Weatherford, 1982). D’Agostini (2001) elaborated on this idea by referencing Bayesians’
requirement for coherence in subjective probabilities:
Once coherence is included in the subjective Bayesian theory, it becomes evident that
'subjective' cannot be confused with 'arbitrary', since all ingredients for assessing
probability must be taken into account, including the knowledge that somebody else
might assess different odds for the same events. Indeed, the coherent subjectivist is far
more responsible (and more ‘objective’, in the sense that ordinary parlance gives to this
word) than those who blindly use standard 'objective' methods. (p. 25)
In other words, the process of appropriately incorporating subjective Bayesian priors – ensuring
coherence and adherence to the laws of probability, as well as accounting for the conditions
affecting degree of belief – introduces even greater levels transparency and thoughtfulness than
typical frequentist methods.
In summary, an important aspect of Bayesian inference is the idea that the prior belief in
the probability of an event occurring is often subjective, as it reflects degree of belief based on
specific, often individual, circumstances. This subjectivity is not only accepted, but valued in
eliciting expert opinions to form prior probabilities. A Bayesian approach such as this serves
two purposes: It accepts that the ideal of purely objective scientific research is unrealistic, and it
does not waste any available, and potentially enlightening, information. Following a
summarizing discussion contrasting and comparing Bayesian versus frequentist approaches, the
process of formally eliciting informative, subjective prior probabilities for use in Bayesian
inference will be described and reviewed.
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Comparing Bayesian and Frequentist Approaches
In his address to a group of statisticians, particle physicists, astrophysicists, and
cosmologists, Bradley Efron (2003), former President of the American Statistical Association,
addressed the conflict between Bayesian and frequentist factions as follows:
The Bayesian-frequentist argument is certainly a long-lived one, even by the standards of
philosophy. It reflects, I believe, two quite different attitudes toward the scientific
process: the cautious frequentist desire for objectivity and consensus, versus the
individual scientist trying aggressively to make the best sense of past data and the best
choice for future direction. (p. 1)
While Efron’s summation was profound and cogent, there are a number of differences
between the two methodologies influencing their different approaches to the scientific process.
Spiegelhalter and Rice (2009) wrote that the main difference between frequentist and Bayesian
approaches to inference is that “Bayesians make statements about the relative evidence for
parameter values given a dataset, while frequentists compare the relative chance of datasets
given a parameter value” (p. 5230). More concisely, Bayesians consider the probability of a
hypothesis given data, while frequentists consider the data, given a hypothesis. In other words,
Bayesians consider all information or evidence available to draw conclusions about a certain
parameter, while frequentists evaluate how well certain data sets conform to a hypothesized
parameter. Encompassed within this overall distinction are a number of other differences
described below.
Interpretations of Probability
As discussed earlier, Bayesian methods employ an understanding of probability as a
degree of belief. In the frequentist approach, probability represents the likelihood that an event
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will occur in a large number of repeated trials – as Gill (2009) wrote, “…frequentists see
probability measure as a property of the outside world and Bayesians view probability as a
personal internalization of observed uncertainty” (p. 27). This differing interpretation is
particularly notable due to the use of prior probabilities in Bayesian approaches – the inclusion
of prior probability distributions to represent a state of knowledge prior to the introduction of
new data is in direct contrast to the frequentist idea that there is some fixed, unchanging
probability of events that can be calculated through frequency counts of long-run experiments.
Hypothesis Testing/Inference
Frequentist hypothesis testing centers around the work of Neyman and Pearson (1933), in
which researchers choose between a null and alternative hypothesis based on the calculation and
acceptance or rejection of false-positive or false-error rates. Neyman and Pearson posited that a
greater amount of objectivity is achieved by limiting error through replication and deductive
reasoning, and alluded to a trade-off between objectivity and drawing conclusions from a single
experiment when they wrote:
…no test based upon a theory of probability can by itself provide any valuable evidence
of the truth or falsehood of a hypothesis. But we may look at the purpose of tests from
another viewpoint. Without hoping to know whether each separate hypothesis is true or
false, we may search for rules to govern our behavior with regard to them, in following
which we insure that, in the long run of experience, we shall not often be wrong. (p. 291)
Offered as a measure of evidence against the null, and not originally intended to be used
in inference, Fisher’s p value is often incorporated into classical hypothesis testing (Fisher 1925;
Fisher 1935; Fisher 1956). There is a large body of literature addressing the problems with the
widespread misinterpretation of p values in significance testing, in which the authors point out
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that incorrect use of p values often involves the conflation of p values with Type 1 error rates, or
conceptual errors in which p values serve as probability statements describing the likelihood of a
hypothesis (Carver, 1978; Cohen, 1994; Dixon, 2003; Gelman & Loken, 2014; Gigerenzer,
1993; Hubbard & Lindsey, 2008; Johansson, 2011; Royall, 2000; Wagenmakers, 2007, etc.).
More relevant to this discussion, however, is why p values and hypothesis testing have been
combined into this widespread hybrid method. Both hypothesis testing and p values were
proposed in response to a culture valuing increased objectivity and rigorous quantitative methods
(Marks, 1997; Matthews, 1995; Porter, 1995). However, with Neyman-Pearson hypothesis
testing’s focus on controlling error rates over the long-run and the limitation of Fisher’s p value
to only indicating evidence against a null hypotheses, Goodman (1999a) suggested that the
coupling of the two approaches is the result of researchers’ understandable desire to be able to
draw conclusions from a single experiment using “objective” methodology. In other words, the
combination of hypothesis testing and p values presents researchers with a seemingly viable,
although often conceptually incorrect, platform for “evidenced-based” research.
Contrastingly, Bayesian methods do offer a formal avenue towards quantifying statistical
evidence for or against a hypothesis. Unlike null hypothesis significance testing, a Bayesian
approach can be used to calculate the probability that, given data or evidence, a hypothesis is true
or untrue. This is done using the “Bayes factor,” the likelihood ratio included in Bayes’ theorem
(Jeffreys, 1961; Robert, 2007). The Bayes factor is a ratio comparing the probability of data
given one hypothesis (D|H1) with the probability of data given an alternative hypothesis (D|H2),
As shown in Equation 1.2, the Bayes Factor essentially indicates the weight of the data in
altering prior odds of a hypothesis into posterior odds.
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𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 =

𝑝𝑝(𝐷𝐷|𝐻𝐻1 )
𝑝𝑝(𝐷𝐷|𝐻𝐻2 )

(1.2)

How closely the prior resembles observed data will determine support or rejection of hypothesis
being tested.
Using the familiar parlance of null hypothesis significance testing, the Bayes factor can
be used to compute how much evidence (in the form of data) revises the probability that a null
hypothesis is true – in essence, the Bayes factor evaluates the predictive accuracy of the null and
alternative hypotheses. This is an important distinction between frequentist and Bayesian
hypothesis testing: While the objective of frequentist hypothesis testing is to consider the
probability of data given a null hypothesis (and accept or reject that null hypothesis based on a
pre-determined threshold of acceptable risk that the observed data are due to chance alone),
Bayesian hypothesis testing aims to evaluate a hypothesis given data (Kass & Raftery, 1995).
Kass and Raftery (1995) offered a comprehensive summation of the uses for,
interpretations of, and advantages and disadvantages of Bayes factors in hypothesis testing. For
examples of studies incorporating Bayesian hypothesis testing for comparing models see
Goodman (199b), Li, Zeng, & Yu (2014), Morey & Rouder (2011), and Ranganathan, Spaiser,
Mann, & Sumpter, (2014). Note that there is also substantial literature surrounding
inconsistencies between conclusions drawn from Bayesian and frequentist hypothesis testing on
similar data (Berger & Berry, 1988; Berger & Sellke, 1987; Casella & Berger, 1987; Moreno &
Girón, 2006, Rocha, Loschi, & Franco, 2011; Samaniego & Reneau, 1994).
A final note on the differences in hypothesis testing using frequentist and Bayesian
approaches: The oft mentioned argument against Bayesian’s incorporation of subjective
probabilities is highlighted when considering hypothesis testing. As Berger and Berry (1988)
emphasized, there are a number of subjective choices made in hypothesis testing – on the
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frequentist side, acceptability of error rates, p values and statistical power are all subjective
choices. Further, both Bayesians and frequentists make subjective choices regarding the
alternative hypotheses with which to compare the null. However, as both Wagenmakers, Lee,
Lodewyckx, and Iverson (2008) and Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, and Iverson (2009) argued,
at least these subjective qualities of hypothesis testing are openly acknowledged, and thus
discussed and critiqued, within a Bayesian approach.
Treatment of Prior Information
As discussed earlier, a fundamental property of Bayesian methodology is the formal
incorporation of prior information. Within the frequentist context, the influence of prior
information is avoided in the interest of ensuring objectivity. Reviews of literature often cite the
methodologies and conclusions of similar studies, and perhaps inform a priori hypotheses,
methodology choice, and model design. Meta-analysis synthesizes information from multiple
sources (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009), and there are information theory
techniques (Akaike, 1992; Burnham and Anderson, 2001) that allow for the comparison and
combination of a number of different models. However, these frequentist approaches do not
allow for the explicit introduction of any prior information into analysis of any new data.
A large component of frequentist angst over Bayesian methodology is centered on the
idea that there is no guarantee that the prior information used by separate researchers examining
the same question is going to be identical or even similar. This is especially true within more
“subjective” Bayesian analysis, as it allows for the incorporation of prior data that is not easily or
universally quantifiable from actual prior experience. As Efron (2013) wrote, “the
Bayesian/frequentist controversy centers on the use of Bayes’ rule in the absence of genuine
prior experience” (p. 133). The resulting threat to replicability and generalizability is contrary to
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frequentist approaches focusing on repeated tests over time in controlled environments.
However, it could be argued that such controlled environments are often unrealistic and that
there is as much subjectivity involved in the design of frequentist studies as there is in the use of
Bayesian priors. As Poirer (1988) pointed out, it is the formal quantification and incorporation
of prior beliefs that brings about increased levels of transparency:
…I believe subjective prior beliefs should play a formal role so that it is easier to
investigate their impact on the results of the analysis. Bayesians must live with such
honesty whereas those who introduce such beliefs informally need not. (p. 130)
Additionally, recall that a number of Bayesian scholars recommend evaluation of the influence
of prior information as a critical step in Bayesian methodology (Berger, 1994; Berger, 2006;
Gelman, Meng, & Stern, 1996; Gill, 2009; Reimeherr et al., 2014; Rubin, 1984; Spiegelhalter &
Rice, 2009). Through the analysis of the sensitivity to and robustness of Bayesian inference to
the prior, valuable conversation is added to the literature surrounding a problem that is otherwise
ignored in frequentist methods.
Even given the increased attention to and discussion of the Bayesian approach to
statistics, frequentist approaches remain the dominant techniques first taught to students of
statistics. In addition to the controversies over the interpretation of probability, prioritization and
understanding of objectivity, and treatment of prior information, Oakes (1986), Schmidt (1996),
and Tversky and Kahneman (1971) suggested additional reasons for the tenacity of researcher
attachment to frequentist techniques like null hypothesis significance testing even in light of
well-documented criticisms. The reliance on significance testing is particularly true within the
social sciences (Gigerenzer, 2004; Harlow, Mulaik, & Steiger, 1997; Hoekstra, Finch, Kiers, &
Johnson, 2012; Kline, 2004). While there does appear to be a general movement away from
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significance testing and p values in the more recent literature, the alternatives often offered are
still based within the frequentist framework. For example, the latest version of the authority in
social science research publication, the American Psychological Association’s Publication
Manual (2013) , encouraged authors to view null hypothesis statistical testing as “but a starting
point” (p. 33) and to seek out and report other frequentist results such as effect sizes and
confidence intervals. A number of authors have extolled the use of alternatives such as
confidence intervals to null hypothesis significance testing within the social sciences (Cumming,
2014; Fidler & Loftus, 2009; Hoekstra, Morey, Rouder & Wagenmakers, 2014), and Gigerenzer
(2004) and Finch et al. (2004) suggested that editorial support of alternatives to null hypothesis
statistical testing is a necessary but insufficient environment to foster alternatives. The editors of
the Journal of Advanced Academics recently revealed new editorial policies expressing
preference for effect sizes and confidence intervals, as well as encouragement of replication of
other studies, over significance testing (McBee & Matthews, 2014). Once again, these are all
frequentist alternatives.
However, Bayes’ popularity is growing in increasing numbers of disciplines – as
Andrews and Baguley (2013) pointed out, Bayesian methods were present in 20% of articles in
the most highly respected statistics journals. As its popularity grows, Bayesian methodology
will face increased attention, scrutiny, and inevitable disagreements among its own practitioners.
For example, within the current overall Bayesian camp, there are ongoing dialogs and
philosophical conflicts surrounding “practical Bayesianism,” the practice of using Bayesian
techniques without a commitment to or adoption of the Bayesian philosophy of science
(Boorsboom & Haig, 2013; Gelman & Shalizi, 2013; Kruschke, 2013; Morey, Romeijn &
Rouder, 2013). Authors like Dennis (1996), while acknowledging advantages in Bayesian
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techniques, expressed reluctance in adopting an approach until more discipline-specific
researchers analyze, discuss and test Bayesian methodologies. Further, the widespread
consideration and discussions of articles like Gorard’s (2014) and Ioannidis’ (2005) indictments
of research methodologies and publication bias hints that the scientific community is open to a
diversity ideas and approaches. This openness, along with increased external and internal
examinations of Bayesian methodology, can only help to improve and move forward scientific
inquiry.
Bayesian Methods and Social Science/Educational Research
Bolstad (2007) succinctly summarized the advantages of a Bayesian approach, noting the
following benefits: The formal consideration of prior information, easily interpretable results in
the form of probability statements, and one universal tool (Bayes’ theorem) that is applicable to
every question or situation. As noted throughout earlier discussion, hypothesis testing and the
use of p values is commonly misunderstood and misused. Additionally, hypothesis testing
requires of researchers a number of judgments and decisions surrounding rejection/acceptance
thresholds, model design, statistic used, etc. In contrast, Bayesian methods require only one
decision in the choice of a prior. Outside of these advantages of simplicity and universality,
however, Bayesian methods are particularly amenable to social science research. Gill (2009)
extolled the suitability of Bayesian methods to social and behavioral research by noting that
many of the overarching questions and topics within the field of human behavior simply don’t fit
within the frequentist (long run probability and replicability) paradigm: “Ideas like ‘personal
utility,’ ‘legislative ideals points,’ ‘cultural influence,’ ‘mental states,’ ‘personality types,’ and
‘principal-agent goal discrepancy’ do not exist as parametrically uniform phenomena in some
physically tangible manner” (p. 26). These questions of human behavior are difficult to
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generalize and measure at the individual level, thus there is a unique amount of uncertainty
within social science research. As Montgomery and Nyhan (2010), Raftery (1996), Rubin
(1984), and Western (1999) explained, Bayesian methods are well-adapted for handling and
expressing uncertainty. Gill further pointed out that the influence of social norms is particularly
important within social science research, especially in terms of biases, judgments and
assumptions brought to the research by researchers, and that Bayesian’s use of subjective
probability and a formal prior is particularly suited to transparently addressing this influence.
Among his arguments in favor of using Bayesian methods for social science research, Raftery
(1995) noted that social science often uses large data sets especially sensitive to p values and
subsequent rejection of null hypotheses, and Western (1999) highlighted Bayesian’s handling of
accounting for uncertainty as a fundamental reason of its compatibility to social science research.
Berk, Western, and Weiss (1995) and Gorard (2014) pointed out that the underlying assumptions
required for significance testing, particularly that of selecting and comparing truly random
samples against a known population, are typically unmet by social science data. Further, due to
ethical and logistical complications, generating random samples (and ultimately using analytical
techniques assuming random sampling) within social science research is often impossible.
Ranganathan, Spaiser, Mann, and Sumpter (2014) highlighted the efficiency in comparing Bayes
factors in model selection in the social sciences, and numerous other authors (Bolstad, 2007;
Gelman, 2008a; Gelman et al., 2004; Gill, 2009) discussed how Bayesian methods are suited for
the types of hierarchical modeling often encountered in the social sciences.
Bayesian Methods and Institutional Research
Chapter Two of this manuscript involves the development of a predictive retention model
using a Bayesian approach. In addition to being considered social science and educational
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research, this type of activity is more specifically categorized as “Institutional Research,” a
specialized type of educational research performed within educational institutions used to inform
decision- and policy-making within that specific institution or system of institutions.
Institutional Research often deals with large sets of population data, as analysts have access to
current and historical information databases, and while experimental designs are not unheard of
within institutional research, the aforementioned difficulties of random selection and controlled
trials within educational research make them difficult and rare. Additionally, the data available
to institutional researchers often simply do not meet the assumptions required in the frequentist
paradigm – as Luan and Zhao (2006) wrote, “Institutional researchers often feel frustrated as
assumptions for valid statistical inferences are often violated with dealing with real institutional
research problems and when messy, ambiguous, and incomplete data are present” (p. 117).
Bayes’ comfort with uncertainty and the explicit use of formal priors within Bayesian methods
provide an alternative avenue for institutional researchers – calling on the expertise and
experience of teachers, administrators and others, institutional researchers can incorporate this
knowledge into formal priors that can then be combined with institutional data to generate a
posteriori conclusions. Additionally, the use of formal priors requires institutional researchers to
unambiguously address and justify potential bias and assumptions.
A major function of institutional research is providing decision-support to administrators,
and as Bernardo and Smith (2000) and Robert (2007) pointed out, Bayesian methods are
particularly helpful in decision-making. Bayesian approaches towards decision-making and
decision support, mostly through the use of Bayesian networks, have been widely employed in
medical and engineering fields – see Berner (2006), Greenes (2014), Lucas, van der Gaag, AbuHanna (2004), and for examples of medical uses and Li, Han and Kang (2013), Rezaee, Raie,
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Nadi, and Ghidary (2011), Swiler, (2006), and Zhu and Deshmukh (2003) for examples within
engineering. However, such approaches to institutional, and even more broadly, educational,
research are less common in the literature. Bekele and Menzel (2005) used Bayesian networks to
predict student performance, noting that they chose a Bayesian approach due to its specialized
skill in handling and expressing uncertainty. Loeb (2003) incorporated Bayesian estimation in
hierarchical linear modeling to explore gender equity in faculty salaries, and Laru, Naykki &
Jarvela (2012) used Bayesian methods to identify predictors of learning outcomes. In the larger
field of educational research, Vomlel (2004), Wainer, Wang, Skorupski and Bradlow (2005), and
Ricketts and Moyeed (2011) incorporated Bayesian methods in the evaluation and improvement
of educational testing, and a number of authors have explored the role of Bayesian methods in
Item Response Theory (Gao and Chen, 2005; Johnson, 2013; May, 2006; Almond, Mislevy
Steinberg, Yan, & Williamson, 2015). A more extensive review of Bayesian networks in
institutional research is included in subsequent sections.
In summary, a Bayesian approach is particularly suited to institutional research for a
number of reasons. The use of formal priors allows for the incorporation of additional sources of
knowledge or experience, as well as the transparent acknowledgement and discussion of biases,
subjectivity, and assumptions involved in the research process. Additionally, a Bayesian
approach embraces the high levels of uncertainty and unmet frequentist assumptions frequently
encountered in institutional research topics. Finally, the qualitative and social science research
skills of institutional researchers are featured during the process of formal elicitation of Bayesian
priors. Chapter Two will incorporate Bayesian methods through the creation and use of a
Bayesian network using formal elicitation, and the following sections will provide a background
and literature review of these two subjects, with a focus on applicability to institutional research.
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Elicitation of Subjective Probabilities from Experts in Order to Form Bayesian Priors
Often, we want to make use of the opinion of a person whom we regard as an expert.
Does the weatherman think it will rain, the doctor that we shall soon get well, the lawyer
that it would be better to settle out of court, or the geologist that there might be lots of oil
at the bottom of a deep hole? (Savage, 1971, p. 795)
The main idea behind the Bayesian approach to statistics is that researchers revise their
understands or beliefs of certain outcomes in light of new evidence – Bayesian statisticians
combine both prior information and new data through the use of Bayes’ theorem in order to
estimate the probability of an outcome (Bolstad, 2007). One of the most exciting aspects of
employing Bayesian methodology in institutional research is the use of experts’ beliefs to
quantify and use prior information. The elicitation of experts’ beliefs introduces a qualitative
aspect to research design, often in the form of interviewing, and the information gathered is then
quantified and used in computing the probability of studied events occurring. Not only does this
methodology enhance potential for increased insight into current educational and institutional
research questions, but it also introduces an opportunity to further explore and realize the
benefits of mixed-methods research. This section focuses on the gathering of experts’ opinions
using various elicitation techniques, including a discussion of the types of probabilities being
elicited, elicitation best practices and challenges, and the role of subjective probability elicitation
within institutional research.
Examples of expert elicitations used to form Bayesian priors can be found in a number of
fields, including business (Bajari & Ye, 2003; Gustafson et al., 2003; Lagerstrӧm, Johnson,
Hӧӧk, & Kӧnig, 2009), clinical settings (Johnson, Tomlinson, Hawker, Granton, & Feldman,
2010; Prajna et al., 2013; Spiegelhalter, Abrams, & Myles, 2004; White, Carpenter, Evans, &
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Schroter, 2007), engineering (Dogan, 2012; Jorgensen, Teigen, & Molokken, 2004; Kaplan,
1992), communications (Vogelgesang & Scharkow, 2009), information security (Ryan,
Mazzuchi, Ryan, de la Cruz, & Cooke, 2012), politics (Buckley, 2004), public policy (Morgan,
2014), and, most commonly, ecology (Choy, O’Leary, & Mengersen, 2009; Kuhnert, Martin,
Mengersen, & Possingham, 2005; Murray et al., 2009; O’Neil, Osborn, Hulme, Lorenzoni, &
Watkinson, 2008). While less common, the literature does include expert elicitations within the
educational field. For example, Bosworth, Gingiss, Porthoff and Roberts-Gray (1999), asked
health education experts to estimate the likelihood of a program’s successful implementation. In
the narrower field of institutional research, Subbiah, Srinivasan, and Shanthi (2011) discussed
the potential advantages of using expert-elicited Bayesian priors in enrollment management.
However, the majority of educational research studies incorporating Bayesian methodologies do
not include elicitation.
Elicitation and Uncertainty
Expert elicitation involves the quantification and transformation of experts’ opinions into
subjective probabilities used to inform a prior probability distribution which is then updated with
new data using Bayesian techniques. Just as discussion of definitions of probability is
fundamental to the differences between frequentist and Bayesian approaches, distinguishing
between a frequentist and Bayesian definition of probability is important in elicitation. As a
main goal of expert elicitation is to quantify uncertainty regarding some particular event or
variable over which an expert can provide better information than any other source, it is
understood that the expert is providing personal, or subjective, probabilities. Expert elicitation
involves the gathering of experts’ degrees of belief in some uncertain event or value. O’Hagan et
al. (2006) explained this further by placing expert elicitation within the context of uncertainty: In
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contrast to aleatory, or random, uncertainty, expert elicitation deals with epistemic (imperfect
knowledge) uncertainty, in that experts are asked to weigh in on the uncertainty related to a
unique or specific event on which there is imperfect knowledge. In other words, experts are
asked to make judgments or decisions under conditions of uncertainty. Ideally, these judgments
and decisions under uncertainty adhere to normative theories of decision making as described by
de Finetti (1973), DeGroot (1970), and Savage (1954), which basically state that an expert’s
degree of belief is a function of rationality, maximizing rewards, and adherence to the axioms of
probability. Normative decision theory also states that probabilities are an adequate, or even
ideal, avenue towards expressing uncertainty (Cooke, 1991). In short, the probabilities elicited
in an expert elicitation are assumed to be a rational, coherent representation of an expert’s
uncertainty. However, as discussed in the upcoming discussion of best practices in elicitation,
the assumption that elicited probabilities are actually those described by the normative theories
of decision making is often challenged.
Elicitation Best Practices
Kadane and Wolfson’s “Experiences in Elicitation” (1998) is used by many researchers
incorporating expert elicited Bayesian priors as a guide to “best practices” (Garthwaite, Kadane,
& O’Hagan, 2005; Gill, 2009; O’Hagan et al., 2006). The authors defined a successful
elicitation as one in which the researcher assures the process is “as easy as possible for subjectmatter experts to tell us what they believe, in probabilistic terms, while reducing how much they
need to know about probability theory to do so” (p. 4). Other authors who have provided stepby-step guidance in the elicitation process in numerous settings include Clemen and Reilly
(2001), Cooke and Goossens (2004), Garthwaite et al. (2005), Meyer and Booker (2001), Phillips
(1999), Shephard and Kirkwood (1994), and Walls and Quigley (2001). A review of these works
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highlights the following major stages of the elicitation process: Preparation of the
researcher/elicitor, selection of expert(s), training of expert(s), confirmed understanding or
acceptance of the model for which judgments are being elicited, and the actual elicitation,
including assessment and feedback. These practices serve to provide the expert ample
opportunity to adequately express her beliefs while also allowing the researcher to gather as
much helpful information as possible and verify her own understanding of what the expert is
trying to communicate. Chapter Two of this manuscript will incorporate the guidance of Kadane
and Wolfson and the later work of O’Hagan et al. (2006) in a formal elicitation of undergraduate
retention experts.
In terms of the actual information being elicited, best practices center around the research
question, the type of prior desired, and the expert(s). There exists a large amount of literature
discussing individuals’ ability (and, more often, lack thereof) to estimate or judge statistical
quantities – see Beach and Swenson (1966), Erlick (1964), and Shuford (1961) as examples –
that speaks to the necessity of careful consideration paid to the types of summary statistics being
elicited. Findings reported by Wallsten, Budescu, Rapoport, Zwick, & Forsyth (1986) and
Wardekker, van der Sluijs, Janssen, Kloprogge, & Petersen (2008) suggested that elicitations
cannot simply rely on experts using words like “likely” or “unlikely” to qualify uncertainty –
elicitations typically involve quantification. Elicitations involving the gathering of a single
probability (see Spetzler & Staël von Holstein, 1975) can be enhanced by asking the experts to
consider probability judgments within the context of gambling (Clemen & Reilly, 2001; Renooij,
2001), relative frequency (Price, 1998), and probability scales (Wang, Dash & Druzdel, 2002).
Winkler (1967) provided an introduction to eliciting probability distributions, although
elicitations within the social sciences seeking probability distributions more often use indirect
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methods (Gill, 2009). For example, Bedrick, Christensen, and Johnson (1997), Higgins, Huxley,
Wapenaar, and Green (2014), and O’Hagan et al. (2006) asked experts to express their beliefs
through quantiles or intervals which were retroactively fitted to probability distributions.
Chaloner and Duncan (1987) discussed the elicitation of multinomial distributions, and
Garthwaite and Dickey (1992) and Garthwaite, Al-Awadhi, Elfadaly, and Jenkinson (2013)
addressed the elicitation of summary statistics related to regression. Garthwaite et al. (2005)
provided recommendations for multivariate elicitations, noting that the joint probability
distribution required in such situations is particularly challenging, while Goldstein (2004) and
Oakley and O’Hagan (2007) explored nonparametric approaches to incorporating expert
elicitations as Bayesian priors.
In many cases, information from multiple experts will be used to form a Bayesian prior,
and a number of authors have addressed and evaluated methods of combining expert opinions in
prior elicitation – see Clemen and Winkler (1999) and Hammitt and Zhang (2013) as examples.
The aggregation of expert opinions is completed mathematically or behaviorally. For example,
the mathematical combination of expert judgments can be accomplished through the use of
averaging (Burgman et al., 2011; Cooke, 1991), pooling (French, 1985; Genest & Zidek, 1986)
or even using Bayesian approaches (Albert et al., 2012; Roback & Givens, 2001). Behavioral
approaches to combining expert judgments involve interaction and consensus building among
the experts. Practices like the Delphi method (Dalkey, 1969) and Nominal Group Technique
(Delbecq, Van De Ven, & Gustafson, 1975) are often used in an effort to counteract challenges
of bullying and “group think” often encountered in group interactions (Clemen & Winkler,
1999). Each approach has drawbacks and challenges, which, as with many of the best practices
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related to expert elicitation, have much to do with the research question or topic and choice of
expert.
A final best practice related to expert elicitation involves testing the elicited information’s
accuracy in terms of the extent to which it matches experts’ true knowledge or beliefs as well as
reality. Garthwaite et al. (2005) recommended examination of the coherence of elicited
probabilities, as well as offering feedback to the experts in an effort to clarify or correct for
inconsistencies. The authors also suggested analyses of the sensitivity of elicited probabilities or
distributions to changes in assumptions or other model parameters. In cases where data
reflecting actual events are available, scoring rules, in which experts are awarded a score based
on the quality of calibration of their judgments with reality, can be used to judge and even
improve the accuracy of elicited probabilities (Gneiting & Raftery, 2007; Matheson & Winkler,
1976; Savage, 1971). Building on the use of scoring rules, Cooke (1991) recommended
gathering multiple expert opinions, weighting each expert’s assessment based on the
performance scores, and then producing a weighted synthesized score.
Challenges of Expert Elicitation
There are a number of challenges related to expert elicitation, the majority of which stem
from the design of the elicitation protocol. As a goal of elicitation is to allow the expert to
communicate her most accurate degree of belief, it is important to design an elicitation protocol
that strives to minimize the introduction of bias or other confounding influences on an expert’s
true degree of belief. Articles designed to serve as guides to designing and carrying out
elicitations (Choy et al., 2009; Jenkinson, 2005) emphasized the importance of carefully
considering and articulating a research question and elicitation protocol as critical parts of the
elicitation process. This is similar to the advice found in texts directed towards standard
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qualitative research (see Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, and Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009), and it is
recommended that thoughtful and measured attention to the various considerations (costs,
timing, expert statistical background, etc.) is given in the design of the elicitation protocol.
Authors studying calibration report that the quality of correspondence between elicited
subjective probabilities and actual occurrences has much to do with the way the elicitation is
conducted (Beach & Braun, 1994; Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982; Ronis & Yates,
1987). Therefore, consideration of the findings of the larger field of calibration research into the
design of an elicitation protocol is one helpful way to increase the likelihood of superior
elicitation. For example, Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, and Kleinbӧlting (1991), Gigerenzer (1996) and
Thomson, Ӧnkal-Atay, Pollock, and Macaulay (2003) found that task characteristics, or how
experts are asked to respond, can influence the extremity and over/under-confidence of elicited
probabilities. Carlson (1993) and Wright and Ayton (1992) suggested that the timing of the
event for which probabilities are being sought affects calibration, while Bornstein and
Zickafoose (1999), and Jonsson and Allwood (2003), and West and Stanovich (1997) found that
the knowledge domain of an elicitation influences judgment. Additionally, the definition of
“expertise” is not always universal (Caley et al., 2013; Martin et al., 2012), and researchers
should recognize that subject-matter expertise does not guarantee skill in expressing probabilistic
beliefs. In their guide to expert elicitation, Kuhnert, Martin, and Griffiths (2010) differentiated
between two styles of elicitation activities – direct, in which experts are asked to provide
opinions in probabilistic terms, and indirect, in which experts are asked to provide opinions in
less technical terms that may be more amenable to their field of expertise – and recommended
that the choice of styles be dependent upon the experts’ background. Fischhoff (1989), Murphy
and Winkler (1984), and O’Hagan et al. (2006) offered strategies for avoiding or mitigating
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potential biases, including expert training, careful facilitation and feedback provided by the
researcher, and paying attention to experts’ coherence of beliefs. Additionally, the introduction
of computer software used to elicit expert belief that can also quickly recognize incoherent,
irrational, or contradictory information, mitigating some of the challenges associated with expert
elicitation (Garthwaite & Dickey, 1992; James, Choy & Mengersen, 2010; Lau & Leong, 1999;
Morris, Oakley, & Crowe, 2014).
Many of the aforementioned challenges to calibration stem from the use of heuristics in
the formation of probability judgements. Hogarth (1987) and Kadane and Wolfson (1998),
expanding on the work of Tversky and Kahneman (1974), provided a list of the common
heuristics that can introduce unhelpful bias into experts’ opinions: Availability bias (an easierto- recall occurrence may incorrectly be deemed more important or likely), anchoring (experts
may calculate probability based on an initial value), overconfidence, and hindsight (experts who
have seen sample data may update their opinion). Heuristics are a particular threat to the
assumption that elicited probabilities are those that can be described under the normative theory
of decision making – the use of heuristics can interfere with the rationality and logic required
under the normative theories. Kynn (2008) warned that psychological research concerning the
bias introduced when experts use heuristics to make probability judgments has not kept up with
the heightened attention paid to Bayesian methods. As Kynn wrote, “…we should be equally
concerned with not only what we ask experts to assess, but how we ask it” (p. 240).
An equally important challenge to expert elicitation deals with bias on the part of the
researcher. Expert elicitations (including the elicitation carried out in Chapter Two) commonly
take the form of an interview, and references to and discussions of researchers’ subjectivity and
bias are common in the interviewing literature. For example, Scheurich (1995) termed the
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potential influences on a qualitative researcher (socioeconomic background, experience,
expertise, funding sources, power) as “baggage,” and recommended that interviewers
thoughtfully consider and disclose these types of baggage. Kvale & Brinkmann (2009) pointed
out that these subjective influences can even be found in the actual transcription of interviews,
thus affecting the subsequent analysis.
Qualitative Research Lessons for Expert Elicitations
These issues of bias and calibration underscore the importance of a well-designed
elicitation in which the expert(s) are carefully chosen and the questions are designed in a way to
minimize the overuse of heuristics and other potential sources of bias affecting experts’
confidence in their judgments. However, formal and informal review of the studies
incorporating expert elicitation of subjective probabilities, including those cited in this
manuscript, reveals little discussion of the psychological theories surrounding probability
judgments or the potential for bias on the part of the experts or the researchers. Additional
research regarding the use of heuristics and mitigation of resulting bias will be necessary as
elicitations to form Bayesian priors become more common. As Hogarth (1975) wrote, elicitation
of subjective probabilities “should be designed both to be compatible with man’s abilities and to
counteract his deficiencies” (p. 284). Additionally, knowledge about the basics of interviewing
techniques is also recommended, as the majority of researchers employing Bayesian
methodology appear to have little to no experience with qualitative techniques such as the
responsive interviewing model described by Rubin & Rubin (2012). In the interest of exposing
and exploring one’s own baggage, as well as that of the experts, researchers using expert
elicitation and Bayesian inference might consider adopting the type of discussion and disclosure
often practiced by more qualitative-leaning peers.
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Expert Elicitations and Institutional Research
As first pointed out by Gill and Walker (2005), a review of the literature reveals that
expert elicitation is much more common within life and engineering sciences than in the social
sciences. However, at least in the studies included as examples in this manuscript, the full
advantages of expert elicitations are not as readily extoled in the sciences. For example, a few of
the clinical and engineering studies reviewed reveal minimal information about the elicitation
process, and even dismiss its value. Dogan (2012) simply mentioned that elicitation was used
without providing any other detail, and White et al. (2007) used language painting the expert
elicitation as a sort of consolation prize to use when other data are unavailable.
Two of the social sciences studies included here as examples addressed the idea that, due
to its relative familiarity and experience with qualitative methods, social science research should
be particularly responsive to the expert elicitation/Bayesian approach (Buckley, 2004;
Vogelgesang & Scharkow, 2009). Buckley further pointed out that the adoption of Bayesian
methodology within the social sciences will only catch on after clear and relevant guidance
regarding the transformation of expert opinion into quantitative data is provided. Buckley’s
sentiment is echoed in Moyé’s (2008) critique of Bayesian clinical research, where he called for
researchers to “take a strong stand for disciplined research methodology” (p. 477) that rivals the
well-articulated and accepted frequentist version.
The social science complexities and nuances of institutional research render the discipline
an excellent candidate for Bayesian methods and expert elicitation. While large amounts of
quantitative data are collected and available, there is also a legacy of qualitative approaches that
can be leveraged and applied towards expert elicitation. In addition to an institutional
researcher’s familiarity with qualitative methods, consider the fact that a large number of experts
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stand at the ready. Based on their experiences, educators and administrators are experts within
their individual classrooms and institutions. Expert elicitation provides an avenue from which
the expertise of these individuals can be mined and combined with other types of data to produce
informed and comprehensive conclusions. Furthermore, expert elicitation is often used to aid
decision making or prediction under conditions of uncertainty, such as instances in which there
are not empirical data available, or the introduction of unfamiliar or new situations or problems.
Additionally, information provided by experts is a viable alternative source of information when
resources are limited (Kuhnert et al., 2010). The ideas of uncertainty and limited resources are
particularly relevant to institutional research, as the field typically operates within tightly
managed budget and calendar situations with varying amounts of access to data and among
unique and changing student populations.
However, before incorporating expert elicitations into institutional research, researchers
should carefully select elicitation techniques that are appropriate to the specific research
questions, experts’ abilities, and the researchers’ own capacity. The researcher should be
knowledgeable in the benefits and challenges of qualitative methods and be prepared to evaluate
and discuss heuristics and bias. Additionally, researchers should have a confident understanding
of and justification for quantification of the elicited prior. As Buckley (2004) pointed out, the
likelihood that the employment of expert elicitation and Bayesian inference in qualitative or
mixed-method social science research will become commonplace is directly related to whether or
not Bayesian scholars can effectively equip researchers to correctly gather, analyze and apply
expert elicitations. In summary, through careful selection of prior type and application of formal
elicitation best practices, institutional researchers can leverage and incorporate expert
information into data analysis and modeling.
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Elicitation Conclusions
Eliciting Bayesian priors serves as an excellent way to explore and better answer
questions for which empirical data are either unavailable or insufficient. As Gill (2009) wrote:
The core of this argument is the idea that if the prior contains more information that
pertains to the estimation problem, then we are foolish to ignore it simply because it does
not neatly fit into some familiar statistical process. (p. 28)
The anxiety introduced by the subjective nature of elicited priors can have benefits
outside increased information and explanatory power. For example, research can only benefit
from increased discussion and disclosure of underlying theories, assumptions, and subjectivities.
Additionally, the elicitation of priors allows for greater communication and collaboration
between researchers and experts, ultimately producing a feedback loop of knowledge
(Garthwaite et al., 2005). The complexity and nuance inherent in institutional research, abundant
experts, and a legacy of effective qualitative research methods highlight the discipline’s
suitability for expert elicitation and Bayesian methodology.
Bayesian Networks
Chapter Two of this manuscript describes a study using a Bayesian approach, in which
expert judgment is elicited and used to design a model that predicts retention. The practice of
modeling processes or systems in order to better understand them is not uncommon. However,
when reasoning or trying to make decisions under conditions of uncertainty, such models need to
account for this uncertainty. Probabilistic networks offer an approach to producing models that
incorporate uncertainty through the use of probabilistic inference. These networks typically
represent causality, illustrate the strength of relationships between variables using conditional
probabilities, incorporate the numerical quantification of choices or preferences, and solve for
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maximum expected utility (Kjӕrulff & Madsen, 2008). Introductions to probabilistic networks
typically involve medical diagnosis examples where a physician is tasked with making a medical
diagnosis given symptoms and other information. In such cases, a probabilistic network is a
formal way of representing the diagnosis process and conclusions, using probabilistic inference
and graphical representations of relationships between and among symptoms, other information,
and the presence of a medical condition. The following sections discuss Bayesian networks, a
specific form of probabilistic networks, including such networks’ development, applications, and
role in educational and institutional research.
Very simply, a Bayesian network is a graph that models the probabilistic relationships
between and among variables. Kjӕrulff and Madsen (2008, p. 3-9) presented a technical
definition of Bayesian networks, describing the two main elements: A directed acyclic graph
(DAG) forming the structure of the model where variables included in the model are represented
by nodes (often squares, ovals, etc.), and the relationships of independence and dependence
between and among the variables, which are represented by directed edges (arrow-ended lines)
and are quantified by conditional probability distributions. Together, these two elements form a
Bayesian network that models a joint probability distribution that is equal to the product of the
conditional distributions of each node. Equation 1.3 describes this joint distribution:
𝑛𝑛

𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 (𝑥𝑥1 , … 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 ) = � 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 | � 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 )

(1.3)

𝑖𝑖=1

Figure 1.1 is an example of a very simple, hypothetical Bayesian network modeling the
retention of an undergraduate student from one year to the next. The simplified Bayesian
network implies that retention is dependent on whether or not the student is engaged in student
life and whether or not the student’s financial need is met. In this example, based on the
relationships indicated by the directed links, “Student Engagement” and “Financial Aid Need
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Met” are “parent” nodes of the “child node,” “Student Retained.” The lack of a link between
“Student Engagement” and “Financial Aid Need Met” implies independence between these two
variables. The Conditional Probability Table (CPT) (Table 1.3) summarizes the probability of
retention given the states, or conditions, of the parent nodes. For example, the probability that a
student will be retained if she is engaged and has her financial need met is 90%, compared to a
35% probability of retention given a lack of engagement and unmet financial need. Note that the
parent nodes (Student Engagement and Financial Need Met) are not conditioned on other nodes,
and thus do not have conditional probabilities – the probabilities associated with these nodes are
considered the prior probabilities.

Figure 1.1 Simplified BN modeling student retention as dependent on student engagement and
financial need met. “Student Engagement” and “Financial Need Met” represent parent nodes.
The directed links represent the parent nodes’ influence on the child node, “Student Retention.”

Table 1.3
Conditional Probability Table (CPT) – Simple Retention BN
Parent nodes
Child node (Student Retained)
Not Retained
Student Engagement Financial Need Met
Retained (%)
(%)
Engaged
Met
90
10
Engaged
Not Met
70
30
Not Engaged
Met
60
40
Not Engaged
Not Met
35
65
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First defined by Kim and Pearl (1983), Pearl (2000) noted that the descriptor “Bayesian
networks” was adopted in order to highlight the following defining characteristics: “(1) the
subjective nature of the input information; (2) the reliance on Bayes’ conditioning as the basis
for updating information; and (3), the distinction between causal and evidential modes of
reasoning…” (p. 12). Note that multiple terms describing probabilistic networks with Bayesian
applications exist in the literature, including “influence diagrams,” “belief networks,” “relevance
diagrams,” and “knowledge maps,” but the term “Bayesian network” or “BN” will be used
throughout this manuscript.
BNs were developed in response to other rule-based systems that failed to consistently
represent and perform under conditions of uncertainty (Pearl, 1988). In short, Bayesian networks
use probability to describe and incorporate uncertainty in a causal situation. Causality is a key
property of BNs, and is addressed and explored in Druzdzel and Simon (1993), Heckerman and
Shachter (1995), and Pearl and Verma (1991). Heckerman (1997) noted that as conditional
dependence can be viewed in terms of causality, the directed links between variables in a BN
typically imply cause and effect relationship between variables. In other words, direct influences
on variables within a BN are represented by a directed edge or arrow between two of the
variables. Through the representation of independence of variables in the DAG (unconnected
nodes), a BN models conditional independence and allows for the “explaining away” (intercausal inference) of less likely events using conditional probability. It is this incorporation of
conditional probabilities that set BNs apart from other graphical models – using conditional
probabilities and Bayes’ theorem (Equation 1.1), a BN models the change in probability of one
event occurring given, or conditioned by, another event occurring (Pearl, 2000). The graphical
representation of these conditional independencies in probabilistic terms provides users with a
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clear representation of the relationships between and among variables within a system or
network.
BNs perform probabilistic inference to estimate an outcome on one or more variables
given the state of other variables. Such inference is completed using applications of Bayes’
theorem (Equation 1.1), where a prior distribution is updated via conditional probabilities
represented in the model to form a posterior distribution. Although Cooper (1990) and Dagum
and Luby (1993) concluded that probabilistic inference within Bayesian networks is an NP-hard
undertaking, a number of researchers have developed inference algorithms to ease computation.
Heckerman (1997) provided an overview of techniques for probabilistic inference in BNs,
highlighting an algorithm endorsed by Howard and Matheson (1984), Olmstead (1983), and
Shachter (1988), which applies Bayes’ theorem to reversals in the directed links between
variables, as well as the algorithm developed by Dawid (1992), Jensen, Lauritzen and Olesen
(1990), and Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter (1988), which employs message passing in a tree
structure. With the development of computing power, the ability to complete inference in
increasingly complex BNs using these and other algorithms has grown (Jensen & Nielsen, 2007).
Kjærulff and Madsen (2008) highlighted the advantages of Bayesian networks, noting the
efficiency in which these networks conduct inference and convey causal relationships, the ease in
which the graphical representations can be understood by numerous audiences, and a firm
foundation in decision theory. Speigelhalter, Dawid, Lauritzen and Cowell (1993) cited the
ability of BNs to simultaneously “…be forgiving of limitations in the data but also exploit the
accumulated data” (p. 221), and Heckerman (1997) acknowledges the ability of BNs to operate
with incomplete data. Additionally, due to the use of Bayesian statistics, a BN can flexibly and
efficiently incorporate additional information as it is gathered. Chapter Two of this manuscript
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will include a Bayesian network used for describing, and ultimately predicting, the likelihood of
retention given certain demographic, academic and affinity variables. BNs are not without their
limitations, however. Niedermeyer (2008) pointed out that novel events may threaten the
predictive validity of BNs, and cautioned that, even with computing advances, a network with a
large number of variables may require unreasonable computing and computational power.
Pourret, Naim, and Marcot (2008) considered the requirement that BNs be acyclic to be a
limitation as feedback loops are often found in reality. Additionally, the reliability and quality of
prior information included in BNs affects a model’s usefulness, although this can be explored
through adequate model evaluation (Cowell, Dawid, & Spiegelhalter, 1993; Pitchforth &
Mengerson, 2013).
Applications - General
Charniak (1991) and Henrion, Breese and Horvitz (1991) offered introductory overviews
of BNs, while Darwiche (2009), Jensen and Nielsen (2007), and Koller and Friedman (2009)
provided detail and instruction on the fundamental theories and applications of BNs. Kjærulff
and Madsen (2008), Korb and Nicholson (2010), and Pourrett, Naim and Marcot (2008) included
applied instruction and real-world examples. A number of applications of BNs in specific fields
can be found throughout the literature. Spiegelhalter et al. (1993) illustrated the use of BNs in
medical and other types of diagnosis, and Donald et al. (2012), Gao, Madden, Chambers, and
Lyons (2005), and Neapolitan (2009) provided illustrations of the use of BNs within
bioinformatics. Other fields employing BNs include marketing (Baesens, Viaene, van den Peol,
Vanthienen, & Dedene, 2002; Cui, Wong, & Lui, 2006; Neapolitan, 2007), space flight (Horvitz
& Barry, 1995), ecology (Landuyt et al., 2013; Marcot, 2008; Shenton, Hart, & Chan, 2014), and
risk assessment in various disciplines such as business (Phillipson, Matthijssen, & Attema,
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2014), engineering and construction (Leu & Chang, 2013; Zhang, Wu, Skibniewski, Zhong, &
Lu, 2014), and health (Aussem, de Morais, Rodrigues, & Corbex, 2012).
Applications - Prediction
As Chapter Two of this manuscript will focus on the development of a BN used for
prediction, particular attention is paid to the application of BNs for that purpose. In their
discussion of the role of causality in BNs, Heckerman, Geiger, and Chickering (1995) wrote the
following of authors supporting the development of causal formalisms within Bayesian
networks:
They argue that the representation of causal knowledge is important not only for
assessment, but for prediction as well. In particular, they argue that causal knowledge –
unlike knowledge of correlation – allows one to derive beliefs about a domain after
intervention. (p. 213)
The key to using a BN for predictive purposes lies in the interpretation of the links
between variables – within a causal Bayesian network, the nodes from which arrows descend are
considered parent nodes and direct, immediate causes of the nodes at which they point.
Friedman, Linial, Nachman, and Pe’er (2000) explained this idea further by pointing out that the
directionality and causal interpretation of the links between nodes allows for observation of
intervention effects – if a parent node is a direct cause of a child node, then a change
(intervention) in the value of the parent node will effect change in the value of its child node.
This causal interpretation of a BN also requires acceptance of the Causal Markov Assumption,
which basically states that a variable is independent of all variables outside of its direct causes
and effects (Hausman & Woodward, 1999; Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines, 2000). Pearl (2000)
provided a comprehensive explanation of causal Bayesian networks.
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Instances of BNs used for prediction are found throughout the literature. Axelrad, Sticha,
Brdiczka, and Shen (2013) and Venkatesh, Cherurveettil, and Sivashanmugam (2014) employed
BNs to predict risks to cybersecurity. Fenton, Neil, and Marquez (2008) built a BN to predict
software defects, Stahlschmidt, Tausendteufel and Härdle (2013) used a BN to predict offender
profiles, and Sun and Shenoy (2007) attempted to predict bankruptcy using BNs. Predictive BNs
are also commonly used in the study of biological networks (Friedman, et al., 2000; Jansen et al.,
2003), medicine (Cho, Park, Kim, Lee & Bates, 2013; Sandri, Berchialla, Baldi, Gregori and De
Blasi, 2014; Jiang, Xue, Brufsky, Khan, & Neapolitan, 2014) and weather forecasting (Cano,
Sordo & Gutiérrez, 2004).
Model Development
A review of the literature concerning best practices in network modeling reveals
consensus on a number of steps that should take place, including comprehensive description of
the model’s principal function and assumptions, careful construction of the network’s structure
and underlying probabilities, assessment of the model’s functionality, and discussion of the
entire model development process (Chen & Pollino, 2012; Crout et al., 2008; Marcot, Steventon,
Sutherland, & McCann, 2006).
Structure and relationships. Spiegelhalter et al. (1993) listed three stages of
constructing a Bayesian network: A qualitative stage in which the author defines the
relationships among and between variables in terms of conditional independence and develops a
graphical model that reflects these relationships, a probabilistic stage in which the author
considers the model’s joint distribution, and a quantitative stage in which the author assigns
values to the underlying conditional probability tables (CPTs). Approaches to each stage can be
manual (theory- and expert-driven) or automatic (data-driven), or even a combination of both.
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The decision regarding approach to model construction often depends on the field on which the
model is based (Chen & Pollino, 2012; Uusitalo, 2007) or the availability of data (Pitchforth &
Mengersen, 2013).
Manual approaches to the construction of a BN require expertise and advanced
familiarity with the system being modeled – manual construction of Bayesian networks will
almost certainly require domain knowledge input from experts or previous research. Neil,
Fenton, and Nielsen (2000) described the manual process of designing the structure of a BN as
“knowledge engineering,” and offered a step-by-step approach to the manual construction of a
BN structure that encourages developers to first focus on the relationships between smaller
groups of variables before considering the relationships among variables in the entire network.
The authors proposed five “natural and reusable patterns in reasoning” (p. 13), termed “idioms,”
that can be used as guidance in modeling directionality, causality, measurement accuracy,
induction, and reconciliation of two competing factors or explanations. See Fenton, Neil, and
Lagnado (2013) as an example of the use of the idioms in the design of network structure. In the
same vein of beginning with the building blocks of networks, Helsper and van der Gaag (2002)
and Fenz (2012) proposed an approach for manual BN development based on ontology, in which
the anticipated model’s operational definitions and assumptions are clearly defined, and
recommended collaboration between the knowledge engineering and domain expert(s) in the
creation of the ontology. More basic approaches to determining the BN’s structure involve
identification of the types of variables within the network (background, problem, mediating, or
symptom) and recognition of the each variable type’s role in a causal network (Kjӕrulff &
Madsen, 2008). Edwards (1999), Blodgett and Anderson (2000), Fenton et al., (2013), Laskey
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and Mahoney (2000), and Xu, Liao and Li (2008) provided examples of the diversity of
approaches to manual construction of a BN.
In cases where data are available, it is possible to learn a BN structure and parameters
from such data. A number of algorithms have been developed to accomplish structure learning,
most of which are either score-based (BN iterations are scored based on data fit) or constraintbased (incorporates a priori understandings of independence among variables) (Margaritis,
2003). Examples of score-based techniques include Naïve Bayes’ (Duda & Hart, 1973),
evolutionary programming (Larrañaga, Karshenas, Bielza, & Santana, 2013), and Tree
Augmented Naïve Bayes’ (TAN) learning (Friedman, Geiger, & Goldszmidt, 1997), while
constraint-based approaches include the PC and SGS algorithms (Spirtes et al., 2000), the
inductive causation (IC) algorithm (Pearl, 2000), and Necessary Path Condition (NPC) (Steck &
Tresp, 1999). Algorithms such as Maximum likelihood (ML), the Expectation-Maximization
(EM) algorithm (Lauritzen, 1995), and Active Learning (Tong & Koller, 2002) are used for
parameter/CPT estimation in BNs. Kjӕrulff and Madsen (2008) and Neapolitan (2004)
presented an in-depth discussion of the steps involved in structure and parameter learning from
data, and Aitkenhead and Aalders (2009) and Cui et al. (2006) provided real-world examples of
purely data-driven learning of BN structure and parameters.
Note that structure learning from data has been criticized for resulting in over-fitting of
data (Clark, 2003), and difficulties in finding and training domain experts for manual
construction are not uncommon. A hybrid approach to constructing BNs in which both expert
guidance and data are incorporated in the determination of structure and parameterization is a
potential solution. For example, Heckerman et al. (1995) proposed that an expert-generated BN
can be subsequently updated and improved upon by observed data. Other hybrid approaches
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involve employing expert knowledge in identifying the presence and type of relationships
between variables and subsequently introducing related constraints in the structure and parameter
learning process – see de Campos and Castellano (2007), Flores, Nicholson, Bruskill, Korb, and
Mascaro (2011), and Niculescu, Mitchell, and Rao (2006) as examples of use of a priori expert
knowledge in combination with data to construct a BN. Masegosa and Moral (2013) proposed
incorporating expert knowledge after the structure is learned from data, providing guidance on
any questionable links identified in the learned structure. Woodberry, Nicholson, Korb, and
Pollino (2005) developed a technique for combining elicited expert knowledge and data to
parameterize a model. In their discussion of the general development of statistical models,
Kjӕrulff and Madsen (2008) noted the importance of a shift from developing a model designed
to replicate the human decision process to developing models to support the human decision
process. The recognition of the value of human expertise in model designing addressed by
Kjӕrulff and Madsen is reflected in the popularity of using a hybrid process to construct a BN.
Chapter two of this manuscript proposes such a hybrid approach to model development,
in which expert opinion is combined with statistical data to predict retention. This proposed
methodology must be considered within the context of over sixty years of discussion of the
clinical-statistical controversy, or the argument regarding the inferiority/superiority of
clinical/statistical prediction. Meehl’s seminal Clinical Versus Statistical Prediction: A
Theoretical Analysis and a Review of the Evidence (1954/1996) articulated the distinction
between statistical/actuarial/formal prediction and clinical/informal/impressionistic prediction,
where the “clinical” method of prediction involves an expert human judge relying on informal
decision-making procedures (experience, intuition, etc.) and the “statistical” method of
prediction involves some formal decision-making rules or formula (statistical regression,
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actuarial tables, etc.) in order to classify or predict. Noting that predictions using these two
methods often differ, Meehl further proposed that statistical prediction is generally at least as or
more accurate and less costly than clinical prediction, rendering it the preferable method of
prediction. A number of authors further explored this clinical vs. statistical issue (Dawes, 1988;
Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989, 1993; Faust, 1991; Goldberg, 1991; Grove & Meehl, 1996; Holt,
1986; Kleinmuntz, 1990; Marchese, 1992; Meehl, 1956, 1957, 1967, 1973, 1986; Sarbin, 1986),
and consistently affirmed the superiority of statistical prediction over clinical prediction.
Extensive meta-analyses performed by Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, and Nelson (2000) and
Ægisdóttir et al. (2006), further confirmed this idea. Both meta-analyses incorporated numerous
studies that included comparisons of clinical and statistical prediction of some type of human
behavior or medical/psychological diagnosis, and both found statistical prediction to be superior
to clinical in most cases. Such conclusions uphold Meehl’s original thesis and argue that, when
available and possible, statistical prediction should be favored over clinical prediction – not only
due to higher likelihood of predictive accuracy, but also because it is generally less costly.
However, Meehl, Grove, and other authors do not completely discount the value of
clinical prediction. For example, in the large meta-analysis by Grove et al. (2000), the authors
pointed out that clinical prediction was found to be on par with statistical prediction in half of the
included studies. The authors attributed inferiority of clinical prediction to commonly cited
heuristics, bias, and lack of feedback (see Dawes, Faust, and Meehl, 1986; Garb, 1989; Hogarth,
1987, Kadane and Wlofson, 1998; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), leaving open the possibility
that attempts to alleviate these causes of error could result in improved, and even superior,
clinical prediction. Additional authors have addressed the role of clinical or expert judgment
within context of its assumed inferiority to statistical prediction. Meehl (1954/1996) recognized
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“special powers of the clinician,” (p.24) particularly in noting clinicians’ ability to identify or
recognize special or unique circumstances that may render statistical predictions inaccurate on a
case-by-case basis, but not in a more general, widespread basis. Dana and Thomas (2006)
further examined the role of clinician in prediction, presenting examples in which more accurate
prediction results from the incorporation of clinician-identified influential factors into statistical
predictive models rather than holistic clinician judgment. The authors suggested that a
clinician’s expertise and valuable experience and input is best realized through “use of a formal,
explicit procedure” (p. 425) – in other words, formal, systematic modeling of clinician decisionmaking incorporates the best of both worlds in the clinical-statistical controversy. As Dana and
Thomas wrote, “Hopefully, the clinical-statistical controversy can move beyond whether we can
deny or replace the talents of human judges to determining how we can use the special
knowledge of human judges in a more rigorous manner” (p. 425). This study in Chapter Two
proposes to do just that – formally and rigorously include the opinions and unique experience of
undergraduate student retention experts into a statistical predictive model.
Model evaluation. Assessment of a BN’s functionality is critical regardless of whether
the model was built for description, classification, or prediction. BNs designed using structure or
parameter learning are often evaluated using measures of fit. The Minimum Description-Length
(MDL) metric, described by Lam and Bacchus (1994) and Rissanen (1978), is commonly
employed as a measure of fit among learned-structure BNs as it reflects model simplicity against
model accuracy. The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is another metric used to evaluate
model fit that also considers model parsimony (Kass & Wasserman, 1995).
It is generally recommended that a final BN reflect parsimony in the number of nodes
and the size of the CPTs for each node (Chen & Pollino, 2012; Adkison, 2009). Model

49

parsimony is accomplished when there is a balance between the number of nodes and model
sensitivity – fewer parent modes simplify the CPTs, but fewer nodes also may result in omitted
information. An approach to simplifying models recommended by Olesen et al. (1989) and Neil
et al. (2000) is “parent divorcing,” in which related parent nodes are combined into one node that
effectively describes the influence of the individual nodes thus reducing the number of nodes and
subsequent complexity of the associated CPTs. Heckerman & Breese (1994) proposed temporal
transformation as an approach to model simplification in which a temporal element is introduced
in the analysis and representation of causal relationships, and Kjӕrulff and Madsen (2008)
recommended a technique involving the creation of a new variable that represents structural and
functional uncertainty in a model.
Models built using expert knowledge require different approaches to model validation.
The experts participating in the elicitation should be asked to provide opinions of the final
network’s accuracy, and if data are available against which to compare, a BN can be evaluated
using measures of predictive accuracy, deviations from expected value, and the extent to which
predictions are calibrated (information reward) (Korb & Nicholson, 2010). Pollino, Woodberry,
Nicholson, Korb, and Hart (2006) recommended evaluating BNs through sensitivity analyses, in
which the magnitude of the effects of changes in a network’s structure or parameters are
measured. Pitchforth and Mengersen (2013) proposed that, as a BN’s performance is a function
of the both its structure and parameters, each of these dimensions should be evaluated for
validity separately in addition to the performance of the model as a whole. Pitchforth and
Mengersen further recommended using psychometric approaches to validity such as those
described in Zumbo and Chan (2014) in evaluating an expert-elicited BN.
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As Chapter Two of this manuscript will detail the creation and use of a predictive BN,
particular attention is paid to the evaluation of a BN’s predictive validity. Cowell, Dawid, and
Spiegelhalter (1993) proposed that, in addition to overall fit, the predictive accuracy for
individual nodes (node fit) and the quality of the modeled relationship between parent and child
node (edge fit) should be evaluated. When data are available, comparing predicted values with
actual values is the most straightforward way to discern a model’s predictive accuracy. In a BN
with learned structure, the original data set is typically divided into subsets, where one is used for
training/calibration and one is used for testing. In addition to comparing a BN’s predictions with
observed data and previously collected data, Pollino et al. (2006) called upon experts to review
and evaluate a proposed BN. Lalande, Bourguignon, Carlier, and Ducher (2013) evaluated
prediction accuracy using Receiver Operating Characteristics curves (ROC) that compare
sensitivity against specificity, while Gutierrez, Plant, and Theiler (2011) used modified
confusion tables to identify thresholds of acceptable risk of error prediction. In addition to these
examples found in the literature, Marcot (2012) provided a review of metrics related to
predictive accuracy, including error rates and confusion tables, ROC curves, k-Fold crossvalidation, Schwarz’ BIC, the true skill statistic, and Cohen’s kappa.
It was earlier noted that one of the major benefits of the Bayesian approach, particularly
when subjective probabilities and judgments are involved, is the increased transparency and
discussion generated. This benefit can be extended into the design and evaluation of BNs. For
example, Jakeman, Letcher, & Norton (2006) recommended a holistic evaluation of the model
including thorough discussion of the development of the model, the model’s sensitivity to
changes in structure, parameters, or assumptions, and whether or not the model is actually useful
in applied settings. As these authors wrote, “….model accuracy (the traditional modeller’s [sic]
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criterion) is only one of the criteria important in real applications” (p. 612). In conclusion, by
evaluating a model’s validity, a researcher is not only ensuring that the model actually describes
the system of interest but is also perpetuating an ongoing, iterative process of critiquing and
improving the model.
Bayesian Networks in Educational and Institutional Research
Chapter Two of this manuscript will describe the development and use of a BN modeling
and predicting the first-year to second-year retention of undergraduate students. As this study
includes elements of educational research used for an institutional research objective, the
following section reviews examples of BNs used in educational and institutional research
throughout the literature.
In their discussion of the development of a dynamic tutoring system powered by a BN,
Conati, Gertner, and VanLehn (2002) wrote that BNs offer a “unifying framework to manage the
uncertainty in student modeling” (p. 372). BNs can be found in a broad array of educational
research topics, including psychometrics and item response modeling (Albert, 1992; Desmarais
& Pu, 2006; Mislevy, Almond, Yan, & Steinberg, 1999), Evidence-Centered Design assessment
(Almond, Mislevy, Steinberg, Yan, & Williamson, 2015; Shute, Hansen, & Almond, 2008),
educational psychology (Nussbaum, 2011), and most commonly, in the design and evaluation of
intelligent tutoring systems (Bunt & Conati, 2003; Ley, Kump & Albert, 2010; VanLehn, 2008).
Xu and Ishitani (2008) and Heckerman (1997) employed Bayesian networks in exploratory
modeling of institutional data, and Xu (2012) used Bayesian networks to produce models of
female faculty professional experiences.
Of particular interest to institutional researchers is the use of BNs for prediction. Meyer
and Xu (2007) developed a BN predicting faculty technology use, and Bekele and Menzel (2005)
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developed a BN correctly predicting performance in high school math nearly two-thirds of the
time. Käser et al. (2013) used a BN predicting students’ math knowledge to inform a
computerized tutoring system, and Galbraith, Merrill, and Kline (2010) explored the predictive
relationship between student evaluations and learning outcomes in college business courses.
Sharabiani, Karim, Sharabiani, Atanasov, & Darabi (2014) predicted the end of course grades for
students in engineering courses using a BN, and Torabi, Moradi, and Khantaimoori (2012)
experimented with a variety of algorithms to build a BN that predicted student performance
given teacher attributes. Kotsiantis, Pierrakas, and Pintelas (2004) and Kotsiantis, Patriacheas,
and Xenos (2010) explored the capabilities of BNs in predicting performance in distance
education courses, ultimately determining that pairing the BN-predicted results with other
classification approaches yielded the most accurate results. Lykourentzou, Giannoukos,
Nikolopoulos, Mpardis, and Loumos (2009) also addressed distance education, using a BN to
model likelihood of course attrition.
A number of authors compared the predictive performance of educational- and
institutional research-related BNs to models developed with other techniques and report mixed
results: Bukralia, Deokar, Sarnikar, and Hawkes (2012) used the Naïve Bayes’ classifier to
develop a BN that predicted attrition in online classes less accurately than other methods like
artificial neural networks and decision trees. Yukselturk, Ozekes, and Tűrel (2014) reported
similar findings when predicting student dropout from an online program. Osmanbegović and
Suljić (2012) found that BN outperformed decision trees and neural networks in predicting
student success in economics courses, while Taruna and Pandey (2014) reported opposite results
for students in engineering courses. In their comparison of BNs and decision trees in predicting
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general academic performance in terms of GPA, Nghe, Janecek, and Haddawy (2007) found
decision trees to be more accurate predictors.
Recall that that one of the two main techniques in designing the structure and assigning
the parameters to a BN involves learning from data. Machine learning and data-mining are
currently significant ideas in educational and institutional research: Peña-Ayala (2014), Romero
and Ventura (2007), and Suhirman, Zain, and Herawan (2014), provided summaries and reviews
of recent educational research incorporating data-mining, with Peña-Ayala noting the popularity
of BNs as frameworks for educational data-mining. Institutional researchers cited machinelearned BNs as tools for identifying previously unrecognized predictive variables (Antons &
Maltz, 2006; Fernandez, Morales, Rodriguez, & Salmerón, 2011; Lykourentzou et al., 2009), and
Heckerman (1997) presented a case study in which historical data concerning student
demographics and college choices were used to build a BN depicting the causal influences on
college plans as a tutorial on the role of data-mining in BNs.
Examples of purely manual construction of BN are rare in the educational and
institutional research literature. In their development of a BN used to model learning
progressions, West et al. (2010) employed experts’ input in addition to other techniques (latent
class analysis) into the design of BN’s structure, but the authors do not comment on the
methodology for specifying the model’s parameters. Almond, Mislevy, Steinberg, Yan, &
Williamson (2015) described the process of eliciting BN structure and parameters, while noting
that models should be updated as data become available. More often, educational and
institutional researchers employ a hybrid process involving learning from data as well as expert
input. van Duijnhoven (2003) used a hybrid methodology in which expert knowledge and
machine learning were applied in the development of a BN modeling student knowledge, and
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subsequently confirmed the expert-elicited structure and parameters against data-generated
models. García, Amandi, Schiaffino, and Campo (2007) designed a BN for identifying learning
styles using theory to manually specify the BN’s structure and a combination of Felder’s (1988)
learning style definitions and data to assign conditional probabilities. Similarly, Wang and Beck
(2013) used a previously developed student skill model to design the structure of a BN, while
using data to parameterize the model.
In a discussion of the use of machine learning to develop a model used to predict
retention, Delen (2010) highlighted how suited machine learning is for institution-specific
settings – an institution’s issues are unique to its population and environment and mining
historical data can provide patterns unique to the institution. However, Delen also pointed out
that data mining and theory-driven research can be used in tandem to identify important variables
and any relationships among them. Although the author did not use a Bayesian approach in
modeling, this idea – the idea of leaving no data behind – echoes one of the most influential
arguments for a Bayesian approach. Extending this idea to the use of BNs in institutional
research, capitalizing on accepted theory and expert input as well as accessibility to historical
data seems an ideal approach to developing BNs to address institutional issues.
In conclusion, the incorporation of BNs into educational and institutional research is an
approach gaining in popularity and application. While BNs related to intelligent tutoring
systems are most popular, they are also found in psychometrics, educational assessment, data
modeling, and, most relevant to this study, prediction of outcomes. The literature reveals a
number of approaches, although models developed through the use of data mining and machine
learning are most common within institutional research. BNs offer an excellent approach to
dealing with the uncertainty inherent in educational research and are particularly suited to the

55

narrower field of institutional research, efficiently handling the type of research questions, data,
and audiences addressed in higher education. di Pietro, Mugion, Musella, Renzi, & Vicard
(2015) advocated for the use BNs in the modeling complexities of higher education, noting that
BNs represent a “holistic”, global approach to answering common institutional research
questions. In addressing the uncertainty inherent in systems of social science, as well as the
complexity and unique nature of institutions, the compatibility of Bayesian approaches with
institutional research is clear. A BN handles the uncertainty in student-related data while also
offering an intuitive, accessible modeling capability that supports the decision-making and
policy-setting processes.
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2

DESIGNING A BAYESIAN NETWORK TO PREDICT LIKELIHOOD OF
RETENTION OF UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS
Ensuring that first-year, degree-seeking undergraduate students return for their

subsequent academic year (“undergraduate first-to second-year retention”) is a high priority issue
in higher education. Nationally, 72.9% of all undergraduate students are retained at the same
institution from their first to second year. This number is higher for students at private nonprofit
institutions (80.3%), slightly lower among public institutions (71.4%), and lowest among forprofit institutions (62.8%) (U.S. Department of Education, 2014). In addition to nationwide
calls to consider retention rates as an accountability measure of student progression and
institutional success (Carey & Aldeman, 2008; Longden, 2006; Pike & Graunke, 2015), various
higher education accreditation agencies and rankings organizations consider retention rates in
assessments of institution quality (Wimshurst, Wortley, Bate, & Allard; 2006). Students and
other stakeholders are negatively affected by the increased time to graduation often resulting
from attrition (Complete College America, 2011), and the costs of recruiting new and
replacement students are high (Noel-Levitz, 2013). Retention rates are particularly important
among tuition-dependent institutions where even small fluctuations in year-over-year retention
result in large impacts in revenue and budget management (Schuh & Gansemer-Topf, 2012).
Due to the importance of retention in enrollment planning and financial management,
developing a clear understanding of the factors that influence students’ decisions to return for a
second year is critical. Through identification of structure, relationships, and interactions in the
retention-related data, it is possible to create a statistical model of current and prior student
retention that can be used to predict future students’ retention decisions. In addition to
enhancing institutional knowledge as the process of development requires clear articulation and
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exploration of aspects of retention, ideal models are easily used and understood by various
stakeholders (institution administrators, researchers, academic advisors, admissions counselors)
and contain the capacity to be updated as student populations change. Additionally, a model that
facilitates prediction of retention aids in the identification of students at risk for attrition, informs
institutional intervention and student advising policy, and enables more precise enrollment
planning.
Research Questions
This study addresses the following research questions:
1.

Based on expert information and data, what are the greatest influences on first-to
second-year undergraduate retention at a small, private liberal arts college in the
southeast?

2. Using this knowledge from both sources, can a graphical model employing Bayesian
Networks be built that adequately predicts retention?
Literature Review
Undergraduate First- to Second-Year Retention
The preeminent literature surrounding retention of U.S. college and university students
suggests that retention is influenced by a combination of pre-college student characteristics and
students’ social and academic experiences once at an institution (Astin, 1993; Bean, 1980, 1985;
Cabrera, Nora, & Castaneda, 1993; Pascarella & Terenzini, 1980, 1991; Tinto, 1975, 1988,
1993). These authors cited student integration into and commitment to the educational and
institutional environments, faculty-student interaction, and social engagement as key influences
on student retention. Tinto’s integration framework (1975, 1993), suggesting that students’
commitment to and likelihood of graduating from an institution grows as they are socially and
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academically integrated, has been explored and modified by numerous authors over the years and
formed the foundation for the study of undergraduate retention and graduation (Swail, 2004).
Astin (1993) focused on the impact of student involvement in college as an influence on
retention, and Bean (1980) emphasized the important role of pre-college characteristics such as
high school performance and socioeconomic status. Cabrera, Nora, and Castaneda (1993) and
Pascarella and Terenzini (1991, 2005) explored the convergence of proposed retention models
and theories and began to introduce and investigate different subpopulations of undergraduate
students and their unique responses to retention predictors. More recent retention literature
indicates a shift towards the inclusion of non-cognitive variables such as motivation, selfefficacy, and academic self-concept into theories of undergraduate retention (Covington, 2000;
Demetriou & Schmitz-Sciborski, 2011; Eccles & Wigfield, 2002).
Additional studies discuss and evaluate specific predictors of retention, and a review of
the most recent of these reveal that retention predictors tend to fall within the following broad
categories: Pre-college student characteristics, pre-college academic preparation, student
characteristics in college, and institutional characteristics. Pre-college student characteristics
include demographic variables such as race-ethnicity, gender, and socioeconomic and firstgeneration status, and the literature points to a trend in which students in underrepresented
minority groups, student with financial challenges, and students who are the first in their family
to attend college are less likely to retain and graduate (The Education Trust, 2004). Pre-college
academic preparation is reflected in students’ high school GPAs, class ranks, and standardized
achievement test scores, and unsurprisingly, are generally positively correlated with retention
within the literature (ACT, 2010; Adelman, 1999; Astin & Oseguera, 2005; Lotkowski, Robbins,
& Noeth, 2004). A large amount of retention literature addressing specific predictors focuses on

99

student characteristics during college, including financial support, distance from home, social
support and engagement, socioeconomic status, academic engagement and participation, and
other non-cognitive attributes. These factors are well summarized by Pascarella and Terenzini
(2005), and tend to predict retention in the direction that one would intuitively expect. For
example, students with less financial support and further distance from home are less likely to
retain compared to students with more financial support and attending college closer to home
(Bista & Foster, 2011; Titus, 2006), and students with superior study skills and psychosocial
attributes tend to retain at higher rates than those without (Robbins et al., 2004). Researchers
have also addressed the role of institutional characteristics such as institutional control,
selectivity, mission, and size in influencing retention (see Astin & Oseguera, 2012; Pike, 2013;
Ryan, 2004; Titus, 2004). The extent to which an institution focuses on retention has also been
found to have impact (Howard, 2013; Oseguera & Rhee, 2009; Porter & Swing, 2006). A
comprehensive listing of commonly named predictors of retention, along with examples found in
the literature, is presented in Appendix A.
As this study focuses on retention within a liberal arts setting, particular attention is paid
to findings of the few authors addressing retention specifically within the liberal arts. Nesler
(1999) focused on retention at a liberal arts college that offered courses exclusively through
distance education to nontraditional students, finding that retention was influenced by a
combination of student and environmental characteristics. Howard (2013) explored the influence
of first-year programming on student retention at rural liberal arts colleges, finding its impact
negligible. Employing analysis of students’ social networks, Eckles and Stradley (2011)
identified the importance of students’ friends on influencing retention at a small liberal arts
college, building upon Thomas’ (2000) findings of the significance of students’ social integration
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on retention at liberal arts colleges. Finally, Gansemer-Topf, Zhang, Beatty, and Paja (2014)
highlighted college transition success, realistic academic expectations, and social integration as
important influences on retention at a small, highly selective liberal arts college, while also
pointing out that unique campus populations can produce unique retention predictor conclusions.
Given smaller liberal arts institutions’ unique populations and the aforementioned reliance on
enrollment and net tuition revenue, the need for a clear understanding of the forces of retention
and the ability to accurately predict the likelihood of retention for individuals or groups of
students becomes apparent.
A Bayesian Approach
This study presents the development of a probabilistic network that models and predicts
first-to second-year undergraduate retention. The network employs a Bayesian approach, where,
through the use of conditional probability rules expressed in Bayes’ theorem (Equation 2.1),
current knowledge or beliefs about the probability of an event occurring (“prior probability”) are
updated with new information in order to form a more accurate prediction (“posterior
probability”). Bolstad (2007) and Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin (2004) provided
comprehensive introductions to Bayesian statistics and data analysis, while Gill (2009) offered a
guide to the approach within the context of social and behavioral sciences. Gigerenzer (2002)
illustrated the use of Bayes’ theorem with applied examples.
𝑝𝑝(𝐵𝐵|𝐴𝐴) =

𝑝𝑝(𝐴𝐴|𝐵𝐵)𝑝𝑝(𝐵𝐵)
𝑝𝑝(𝐴𝐴)

(2.1)

The use of the word “beliefs” in describing the probability updating in Bayesian
methodology is important. A Bayesian approach to probability is in direct contrast to a
frequentist approach in that Bayesian statistics interprets probability as a degree of belief rather
than as the long-term proportion of successful outcomes to number of attempts. This degree of
101

belief represents prior knowledge pertaining to the likelihood of an event, which is then updated
with data relevant to this event in order to form a new, or posterior, belief in the probability of
the same event occurring. Within the larger field of Bayesian statistics, the use and definition of
a priori knowledge and beliefs (“priors”) is an ongoing discussion, and the choice and use of
prior type is often driven by the weight assigned to and source of the prior knowledge.
Uninformative priors are those that provide little additional information or explanatory power
(Gill, 2009), and Kass and Wasserman (1996) and Yang and Berger (1997) provided a catalog
and review of such priors. Priors that intentionally include knowledge designed to influence
posterior probabilities are termed “informative,” and can be derived from a number of sources
such as previous studies and results or researcher expertise (Gelman et al., 2004; Gill, 2009).
Press (2003) outlined the advantages of informative priors, noting that they capitalize on expert
knowledge and present an avenue for analysis when other information (“objective” Bayesian
priors, or even a frequentist approach) is unavailable.
It is this use of informative priors that prompts the common criticism that Bayesian
statistics employs subjective probability, and thus contradicts the objectivity valued in the
modern scientific method. A number of authors have addressed this criticism by pointing out
that, regardless of approach, an expectation of pure objectivity is unreasonable. Researchers’
choices regarding research questions, methodologies, and analysis techniques could all be
considered subjective choices (Berger, 2006; Gill, 2009; Hennig, 2009; Press & Tanur; 2001;
Stevens & O’Hagan, 2002; Weatherford, 1982). Additionally, requirements of coherence and
adherence to the laws of probability limit the use of arbitrary and unrealistic informative priors
(Bovens & Hartmann, 2003), and, as D’Agostini (2001) describes, the process through which
subjective Bayesians consider and account for the conditions affecting their degrees of belief and
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choice of priors leads to a conclusion that “the coherent subjectivist is far more responsible (and
more "objective", in the sense that ordinary parlance gives to this word) than those who blindly
use standard 'objective' methods” (p. 25).
Bayesian networks. A goal of this study is the construction of a predictive graphical
model that employs Bayesian methodology. A Bayesian network (BN) is a graphical network
that, using Bayes’ theorem to calculate conditional and joint probabilities, models the
probabilistic relationship between and among variables. A BN consists of two main elements: A
directed acyclic graph (DAG) forming the structure of the model, and the independent/dependent
relationships between the variables that are quantified by conditional probability distributions
(Kjӕrulff & Madsen, 2008). Each variable included in the network has a finite set of mutually
exclusive states, and variables with directed edges pointing towards other variables are
considered “parent” nodes of “children” nodes – variables not sharing a directed edge are
considered independent of each other. Conditional probability tables (CPTs) are attached to each
variable, in which the conditional probabilities of each variable given the state of other variables
are presented, and the entire set of probability tables expresses the full model’s parameter set
(Equation 2.2). BNs are unique from other graphical models in that, through the use of Bayesian
probabilistic inferences, users are provided with a clear representation of independencies,
dependencies, and uncertainty. Pearl (1988) and Lauritzen (1996) offered comprehensive
introductions to graphical models and BNs, and Pearl and Verma (1991), Druzdzel and Simon
(1993), and Heckerman (1997) explored the capability of BNs to illustrate conditional
dependence and causal influence. There are a number of techniques for probabilistic inference
within BNs, and different algorithms often used are discussed by Dawid (1992), Jensen,
Lauritzen, and Olesen (1988), and Heckerman (1997). With the development of computing
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power, the ability to complete inference in increasingly complex BNs using algorithms has
increased (Jensen & Nielsen, 2007).
𝑛𝑛

𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 (𝑥𝑥1 , … 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 ) = � 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 | � 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 )

(2.2)

𝑖𝑖=1

Kjærulff and Madsen (2008) highlighted the advantages of Bayesian networks, noting the
efficiency in which these networks conduct inference and convey causal relationships, the ease in
which the graphical representations can be understood by numerous audiences, and the
methodology’s firm foundation in decision theory. Speigelhalter, Dawid, Lauritzen, and Cowell
(1993) cited the ability of BNs to simultaneously “…be forgiving of limitations in the data but
also exploit the accumulated data” (p. 221), and Heckerman (1997) acknowledged the ability of
BNs to operate with incomplete data. Additionally, due to the use of Bayesian statistics, a BN
can flexibly and efficiently incorporate additional information as it is gathered. BNs are not
without their limitations, however. Neidermeyer (2008) pointed out that novel events may
threaten the predictive validity of BNs, and cautioned that, even with computing advances, a
network with a large number of variables may require unreasonable computing and
computational power. Pourret, Naim, and Marcot (2008) considered the requirement that BNs be
acyclic to be a limitation as feedback loops are often found in reality. Additionally, poor
reliability and quality of prior information included in BNs negatively affects a model’s
usefulness, although this can be mitigated through adequate model evaluation (Cowell, Dawid, &
Spiegelhalter, 1993; Pitchforth & Mengerson, 2013).
Bayesian networks are often developed and used for prediction because BNs can be
considered predictive due to the interpretation of the links between variables as causal. For
example, if a parent node is a direct cause of a child node, then a change (intervention) in the
value of the parent node will change the value of the child mode – the effect can be predicted
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based on the intervention. Pearl (2000) and Friedman, Linial, Nachman, and Pe’er (2000)
provided explanations of causal BNs, and Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (2000) provided a
background of the Causal Markov Assumption, upon which a causal/predictive interpretation of
BNs is predicated. In this study, a BN is used to predict the likelihood of first-to second-year
undergraduate retention given certain conditions of other variables.
Bayesian network development. Spiegelhalter et al. (1993) named three stages of
constructing a Bayesian network: A qualitative stage in which the author defines the
relationships among and between variables in terms of conditional independence and develops a
graphical model that reflects these relationships, a probabilistic stage in which the author
considers the model’s joint distribution, and a quantitative stage in which the author assigns
values to the underlying CPTs. Approaches to each stage can be manual (theory- and expertdriven) or automatic (data-driven), or even a combination of both. The decision regarding
approach to model construction often depends on the field on which the model is based (Chen &
Pollino, 2012; Uusitalo, 2007) or the availability of data (Pitchforth & Mengersen, 2013).
Manual construction of a model involves input from experts or previous research.
Approaches to manually determining the structure and relationships of a BN range from complex
use of idioms and ontology (Fenton, Neil, & Lagnado, 2013; Fenz, 2012) to more simple
methods involving identification of each variable and their causal influences/influencers
(Kjӕrulff & Madsen, 2008). Commonly cited authors such as Garthwaite, Kadane, and O’Hagan
(2005), Gill (2009), Kadane and Wolfson (1998), and O’Hagan et al. (2006) provided a list of
“best practices” related to elicitation of expert knowledge, and review of these works highlights
the major stages of a successful elicitation process: Preparation of the researcher/elicitor,
selection of expert(s), training of expert(s), confirmed understanding or acceptance of the model
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for which judgments are being elicited, and the actual elicitation, including assessment and
feedback. These practices serve to provide the expert ample opportunity to adequately express
her beliefs while also allowing the researcher to gather as much helpful information as possible
and verify her own understanding of what the expert is trying to communicate.
The structure and parameters of a BN can also be developed automatically, using
machine learning from data. Algorithms that enable learning from data are either score-based,
where successive iterations are scored based on data fit, or constraint-based, where a priori
understandings of independence among variables are incorporated (Margaritis, 2003). Although
there are a number of approaches involving these two types of algorithms, many of which are
described in Neapolitan (2004) and Kjӕrulff and Madsen (2008), this study employs Tree
Augmented Naïve Bayes’ (TAN) learning as described by Friedman, Geiger, and Goldszmidt
(1997) as part of the model development process.
Both aforementioned approaches to model development face challenges. Within the
manual approach, experts’ potential use of heuristics in the formation of probability judgements
(see Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) threatens the reliability and accuracy of information elicited.
Learning BNs from data has been criticized for over-fitting (Clark, 2003). In response to these
difficulties, a hybrid manual/data-driven approach developed. Heckerman, Geiger, and
Chickering (1995) first proposed that an expert-generated BN can be subsequently updated and
improved upon by observed data, and numerous authors paired expert knowledge with machine
learning to build BNs (de Campos & Castellano, 2007; Flores, Nicholson, Bruskill, Korb, &
Mascaro, 2011; Masegosa & Moral, 2013; Niculescu, Mitchell, & Rao, 2006; Woodberry,
Nicholson, Korb, & Pollino, 2005).
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This study engages a hybrid approach to model development, in which formal elicitation
of expert opinion is combined with statistical data to predict retention. Note that this hybrid
approach to building a predictive model is applicable in larger discussions of clinical and
statistical prediction, where the “clinical” method of prediction involves an expert human judge
relying on informal decision-making procedures while the “statistical” method of prediction
involves some formal decision-making rules or formula (actuarial tables, for example) in order to
classify or predict. First discussed by Meehl (1954/1996), the superiority of statistical prediction
over clinical prediction within the realms of social sciences, human behavior, and medicine is
confirmed by numerous other studies, particularly within terms of accuracy and cost (Ægisdóttir
et al., 2006; Dawes, 1988; Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989, 1993; Grove & Meehl, 1996; Grove,
Zald, Lebow, Snitz, & Nelson, 2000; Meehl, 1956, 1957, 1967, 1973, 1986). However, these
authors did not suggest that clinical, or expert, prediction should simply be ignored. Instead,
many authors attributed the overall inferiority of clinical prediction to common heuristics,
leaving open the possibility that carefully conducted elicitations designed to minimize bias and
error could improve clinical prediction. Dana and Thomas (2006), explored situations in which
clinicians’ predictions could improve model accuracy, noting that the “use of a formal, explicit
procedure” (p. 425) is critical in best eliciting and incorporating clinicians’ expertise and
valuable experience into models. This study proposes to formally and rigorously include the
opinions and unique experience of undergraduate student retention experts into a statisticallydesigned predictive model.
Implications for Current Study
This study focuses on the hybrid development of a predictive Bayesian network that will
be used to model and predict the likelihood of first-to second-year undergraduate retention.
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Retention is a topic within the larger realm of institutional research, and a review of the literature
reveals that the use of BNs for prediction in institutional research is not rare. See the following
as examples of such research: Bekele & Menzel (2005), Galbraith, Merrill, and Kline (2010),
Käser et al. (2013), Kotsiantis, Patriacheas, and Xenos (2010), Meyer and Xu (2007), Sharabiani,
Karim, Sharabiani, Atanasov, and Darabi (2014), and Torabi, Moradi, and Khantaimoori (2012).
However, none of these authors employed a hybrid expert/data approach to model construction,
or, when applicable to the research design, provided details concerning the elicitation of expert
knowledge. The choice of using a BN to model and predict retention is based on a number of
factors – the intuitive nature of a graphical model is appropriate for a range of audiences, the
ease in which the model updates when presented with new cases and information, and the ability
to incorporate both expert and data-learned information into the model. This hybrid design
method incorporates the work of other scholars, unobserved patterns and trends in historical data,
and the specific and unique experience and knowledge of campus experts. Such an approach
follows the very “Bayesian” idea of leaving no relevant information behind.
Methodology
Data/Population
This study involves the construction of a Bayesian network (BN) that models and
predicts the likelihood of a first-year undergraduate student returning for her second academic
year at a small, private women’s college in the southeast with an annual undergraduate degreeseeking enrollment of approximately 830 students. First-to second-year retention rates from
2009 to 2014 averaged 83%, meaning that, on average, 17% of first-year students have not
returned for their second year. Retention rates are calculated using cohorts of students. For
example, a student entering as part of the fall 2014 cohort of first-year students is considered
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retained if she is still enrolled as of an enrollment census date in early fall 2015, and an overall
retention rate represents the percentage of cohort students still enrolled in the following fall
semester. Student-related quantitative data (admissions, demographic, financial, and academic
information) used in the model development process was sourced from institutional databases
and includes information on 1,438 degree-seeking first-time students entering the institution
from fall 2009 until fall 2014.
Model Development
Development of the BN retention model took place in four major stages:
1. The construction and comparison of two initial BNs, one learned solely by existing
data and incorporating variables identified in the literature (“straw man” model), and
one designed through the elicitation of expert opinions regarding model structure and
important variables to include (“expert-elicited structural” model).
2. The construction of an interim BN incorporating the structural insights provided by
the experts and machine-learned parameters for variables on which data were
available (“interim” model).
3. The presentation of this interim model to retention experts for review and formal
elicitation of prior probabilities on model variables for which no data were available
or learned parameters were suspect.
4. The development of a final BN (“final” model), reflecting a hybrid method of
construction where the BN’s structure and parameters were determined through a
combination of expert information and machine learning.
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Each iteration of models were evaluated on a number of measures, including predictive
validity, internal validity, model complexity, and analysis of sensitivity. The following sections
describe these major stages of model development in detail.
Initial data-learned model. Using scholarly literature, the researcher identified
variables commonly understood to influence retention. These variables are discussed in detail in
the included literature review and are also presented in Appendix A. In addition to compiling
quantitative information for the identified variables on which the institution has collected and
stored data, the researcher noted literature-identified variables not currently available in
institutional databases for future presentation to experts for insight and opinion.
Incorporating the literature-identified variables and compiled data from the 2009 through
2011 cohorts (data from more recent cohorts were reserved for later model iterations), the
researcher used Netica 5.2 to develop a “straw man” BN. The BN’s structure was learned
through Netica’s Tree Augmented Naïve Bayes (TAN) structure learning, a maximum posterior
probability score-based technique that examines correlations and includes more relaxed
independence assumptions over Naïve Bayes (Friedman, Geiger, & Goldszmidt, 1997), and
parameters were learned using an expectation–maximization (EM) algorithm. It was understood
that the resulting model was only to be used as a guide or “first-pass” at developing a retention
model, as the researcher recognized a lack of non-cognitive data and institution-specific insight
that would ultimately be incorporated through the elicitation of expert information. The “straw
man” BN is presented in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1. Initial data- and structure-learned “Straw-Man” BN.
Network interpretation and use. Without imposing a new student retention scenario and
its related properties on the “straw-man” BN, each of the network’s nodes show the current-state
percentage distribution of all prior cases on each variable. For example, all other conditions held
constant, the BN demonstrates 81.7% of first-year students from 2009-2011 are retained to their
second year. Just over one-half (52.2%) of students included in the model are eligible to receive
Pell grants, less than one-fifth (17.6%) are first-generation students, and 43.6% of students are
more than three hours from their home. Netica automatically discretizes continuous variables
using existing distributions found in the data – nodes depicting measures of students’ academic
preparedness (HS GPA, HS Rank, SAT and ACT scores) were thus discretized into three
approximately equal bins. Note that all variable classes/categories will ultimately be reviewed
and potentially modified by experts.
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In addition to demonstrating the current state of retention and each of the variables
thought to influence retention, the machine-learned structure of the model reveals that a number
of the variables are related to each other in some way through the placement of directed edges
(arrows) between different variables. For instance “Citz URM,” a node describing whether or
not a student is an under-represented minority (“URM”), not an under-represented minority
(“NON-URM”), or international student (“INT”), appears to have a relationship with a student’s
SAT Math score (“SATM”) and Pell-eligibility (“Pell”). Unsurprisingly, a student’s high school
GPA is related to her high school rank percentile (“HS Rank”), and ACT Composite scores
(“ACTCO”) are related to SAT scores (“SATM,” “SATV,” and “SATW”). More surprisingly,
ACT Composite scores also appear to have a relationship with a student’s distance from home
(“Hours from Home”), perhaps due to geographic ACT/SAT preferences. The relationships
presented in the “straw man” model were ultimately explored in further model iterations, using
insights provided by experts.
The predictive application of this type of model is demonstrated through the addition of
findings, or “cases.” In other words, updating the predictor nodes with the properties of a
specific retention case will allow a user to view an updated likelihood of retention. When
interpreting the results of the model, it is important to consider that adding a finding on one node
tells the network that a new case has been added where information is only known on that one
variable – the network will estimate the case’s standings on all other variables based on existing
data. For example, if interested in the change in likelihood of enrollment based on firstgeneration status, an update of the “First Generation” node to reflect a student is indeed firstgeneration decreases the likelihood of retention from 81.7% to 78.7%, given that all other
retention-related variables are held steady. If a case’s status on other variables are known, then
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these can be entered as well and predicted retention will be updated accordingly using Bayesian
inference. This quick updating and dynamic presentation is one of the prime advantages to
Netica’s BN software. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show the difference in predicted retention of two
different cases where each case’s status on one or more of the retention-related variables are
known.

Figure 2.2. “Straw Man” BN Scenario 1. A student is known to be First Generation (coded as
“1”). Note that probability of retention decreased from 81.7% to 78.7%.
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Figure 2.3. “Straw Man” BN Scenario 2. A student is known to be Pell-ineligible (coded “0”),
is more than 3.4 hours from home, was ranked within the top 10% of their high school class, and
scored at least a 620 on the SAT English component. Note that probability of retention increased
from 81.7% to 89.5%.
Model evaluation. As part of the structure and parameter learning process, the data used
in the initial “straw man” BN were split into subsets for cross-validation. Cross-validation is
often used to evaluate the predictive accuracy of models, and is built upon the premise of
partitioning data so that a model can be learned from one data set (the training set) and the
resulting derived model’s predictive accuracy be evaluated against the remaining data (the
testing set) (Geisser, 1975; Stone, 1974). Many approaches to cross-validation appear in the
literature, with general advice that the method chosen best represent the research goals and data
characteristics while minimizing the trade-off between complexity and performance (Hastie,
Tibshirani, & Friedman, 2009; Morrison, Bryant, Terejanu, & Miki, 2013). Given this study’s
context and objectives, the researcher employed the guidance of other studies incorporating
machine-learning and Bayesian networks (see Alqallaf & Gustafson, 2001; Fienen & Plant,
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2014; May, Maier, & Dandy, 2010 as examples) and used k-fold cross-validation for this model
and all future models. K-fold cross-validation involves randomly splitting cases into k equallysized partitions, cross-validating each partitioned sample across the remaining partitions, and
then averaging predictive performance across all partitions. A main advantage of k-fold cross
validation is that it allows for the use of as much training data as possible while protecting
against model overfit and providing measurements of predictive performance. Additionally,
when k is greater than two but also not too large, k-fold cross-validation at least partially
addresses the “bias/variance” dilemma described by Geman, Bienestock, and Doursat (1992), in
which minimization of potential bias and prediction error created by an inappropriate data split
competes with the minimization of variance that is created by using a number of training sets to
estimate a model’s parameters. Citing Breiman and Spector (1992) and Kohavi (1995), Hastie et
al. (2009) recommended five- to ten-fold cross-validation as a bias/variance dilemma
“compromise” (p. 243), and due to a somewhat limited amount of cases (n=729 in cohorts 20092011 and n=709 in cohorts 2012-2014), this study employs five-fold cross-validation in the
“straw man” BN and all future BNs.
Methods for averaging confusion matrices resulting from each fold as described by
Marcot (2012) and Boyce, Vernier, Nielsen, & Schmiegelow (2002) were used to estimate
overall model predictive performance using a Confusion Matrix as presented in Table 2.1. In
terms of accuracy, the “straw man” model predicted likelihood of retention correctly in 79.7%
(570/715) of cases. In terms of misclassification, the model incorrectly predicted retention onefifth (20.3%) of the time.
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Table 2.1
Confusion Matrix and Error Rate – “Straw Man” BN
Predicted
Retained
Not Retained
566
19
126
4

Actual
Retained
Not Retained

A Receiver Operating Characteristic curve (ROC) is another way to gather information
about the predictive capability of the “straw man” BN. Figure 2.4 presents a ROC curve related
to the “straw man” BN, where the model’s percent of true positive predictions (a measure of
sensitivity) is plotted against the percent of false positive predictions (a measure of specificity) at
different threshold values. The area between the BN curve and the straight dashed line (a ROC
curve representing a completely uninformative model) represents the difference in an
uninformative model and the more predictive “straw man” BN at different thresholds. From
shape alone, it is clear that the “straw man” BN is more predictively accurate at lower thresholds.
Further, the area under the “straw man” BN ROC curve (AUC) is calculated to be .55089, a
value that is considered a poor measure of model prediction performance (Hand, 1997).
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1

True Positive Rate

0.8

0.6

0.4

AUC = .55809
0.2

0
0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

False Positive Rate
ROC - BN

Uninformative ROC

Figure 2.4. “Straw Man” BN ROC Curve. This figure illustrates the model’s predictive
accuracy at different thresholds (solid line), as compared to an uninformative model (dashed
line), as well as the AUC.

The 20% error rate and the small AUC hint at the fact that there is a large amount of
uncertainty due to influences unaccounted for in the network. The sensitivity analysis presented
in Table 2.2 supports this suggestion, in that it demonstrates the degree to which variation in
retention likelihood is explained by the other included variables (Marcot, Steventon, Sutherland,
& McCann, 2006). The Mutual Info column demonstrates the expected decrease in uncertainty
(as expressed by entropy) in retention likelihood given a state of another variable included in the
model. The most influential variable on likelihood of retention is a student’s SAT Reading
score, but even knowing this score will only decrease uncertainty by 3%.
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Table 2.2
Sensitivity Analysis of "Retained" to Other Variables Included in “Straw Man” BN
Variable
Mutual Info
Percent
Variance of Beliefs
SATV
.0206
2.99
.0046
SATW
.0179
2.59
.0037
SATM
.0158
2.27
.0033
Citz URM
.0116
1.68
.0025
HS Rank
.0093
1.36
.0018
ACTCO
.0068
.99
.0015
HS GPA
.0038
.56
.0008
Hours from Home
.0028
.40
.0006
First Generation
.0011
.15
.0002
Pell
.0003
.04
.0001
In addition to evaluating a model’s predictive performance and sensitivity, a final
evaluative measure involves considering model complexity. Complexity can be measured by the
number of variables, links, and node states, and is typically used for comparing different models
(Marcot, 2012). However, it is also helpful to consider model complexity as part of a holistic
evaluation of single models in an effort to examine variable connectivity and dependence.
Additionally, complexity is not a necessary condition for reliability or additional insight, so
parsimony should receive priority (Jakeman & Hornberger, 1993). The “straw man” BN’s
complexity measures are summarized in Table 2.3, and indicate a not particularly complex
model.
Table 2.3
“Straw Man” BN Model Complexity Metrics
Metric
Count
Nodes
11
Links
19
Node States
30

In summary, although the “straw man” BN can be described as parsimonious based on
measures of complexity, evaluating the “straw man” BN in terms of predictive performance and
sensitivity reveals a weak model. This was not entirely unexpected for a number of reasons: 1)
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due to a lack of available non-cognitive quantitative data available, the model incorporated very
few of the variables often cited in literature, 2) the model was allowed to be machine-learned
with essentially no supervision (e.g. automatic discretization of continuous variable node states),
and, 3) the model excludes institution-specific or contextual variables and constraints
recommended by retention experts. However, the machine-learned “straw-man” model does
provide a starting place for comparison and insight for future model iterations.
Structure elicitation. An important aspect of this research is the combination of
machine-learning and expert opinion in order to build a BN that accurately and efficiently
predicts retention. The first step in incorporating expert opinion was to query retention experts
regarding their beliefs about the structure of a graphical network that predicts retention, which
was then compared to the machine-learned structure of the “straw man” BN in the creation of an
interim model. The following section outlines this process of structure elicitation from the
experts, and incorporates the recommendations of Fenz (2012) to emphasize consistent operating
definitions and O’Hagan et al. (2006) in the design of the structure elicitation protocol.
Experts. The experts participating in the session have a combined twenty-five years of
experience at the institution working directly with students. Expert A is an Assistant Dean of the
College and Director of Academic Advising who has been with the institution for fifteen years,
and Expert B is an Associate Director of Academic Advising who has been at the institution for
ten years. Both individuals have extensive personal experience with the reasons first-year
students leave the institution, as well as domain knowledge regarding industry-wide retention
issues.
Variable elicitation. As a first step in elicitation of the expert-elicited structural BN, the
researcher presented the experts with a list of variables identified in the literature as related to
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undergraduate retention. The experts were also provided with proposed operating definitions
and variable classes. An example of what the experts were asked to review is provided in
Appendix B. After providing insight on the inclusion or exclusion of certain variables based on
relevance to the institution, the experts offered revisions to operating definitions and the
groupings (variable classes) of states of variables. The experts also proposed new variables that,
in the experts’ experience through working with and counseling students at risk of attrition, are
important predictors of retention that were not identified in the literature.
Table 2.4 summarizes the list of variables agreed upon by the experts. In their discussion
of race/ethnicity or first-generation status as predictors of retention, the experts noted that while
there is nothing about race/ethnicity or fist-generation status alone that influences retention
alone, it is highly related to stereotype threat. For example, the experts agreed that women of
color are more likely to succumb to stereotype threat, and are therefore less likely to seek and
access academic support and tutoring. This idea is also supported in the literature – see Steele
(1997) and Aronson & Steele (2005) as examples. The experts also proposed two variables
related to academic support as influences of retention, while emphasizing that institutional
emphasis on academic support (as measured by spending or resource allocation to academic
support programming) is separate and distinct from whether or not a student actually accessed
such academic support programming. Institutional emphasis on increasing retention was also
noted as an influence on retention, and the experts identified a shift in institutional focus on
retention occurring in the year 2011 as evidenced by the hiring of personnel charged with
addressing retention issues. Experts noted that students’ study skills (time management,
academic discipline, etc.) and course attendance patterns, while potentially related to each other,
should also be included as exclusive variables in the retention model. See Allen, Robbins,

120

Casillas, and Oh (2008), Kennett and Reed (2009), and Seo (2012) for discussions of these
variables and their influence on retention in the literature. Note that the experts first
recommended that the study skills and attendance variables should be used in place of other
commonly employed academic preparedness variables (standardized test scores, high school
academic records), opining that the institution’s students are typically prepared intellectually and
academically, but may lack the confidence or study skills necessary for academic success. After
extensive discussion, the experts agreed that a composite variable representing academic
preparation should be employed – the “Academic Rank” variable in Table 2.4 is such a
composite variable and incorporates high school quality, high school academic record, and
standardized test scores. In terms of social support and its influence on retention, the experts
cited Eckles’ and Stradley’s (2011) analysis of social networks on student retention and affirmed
the relevance of the study’s conclusions that the negative feelings of one student act as a
contagion towards others while students’ positive feelings can act as an inoculation against
negativity, albeit in a weaker capacity. The experts discussed the need for including variables
addressing students’ financial need, noting that financial issues and a lack of financial aid
literacy are more likely to influence retention when other factors, such as academic struggle, are
present as well. Additionally, the experts argued that Pell-eligibility, a commonly cited influence
on retention, is not an appropriate proxy for students with financial issues at the institution as
one-half of the institution’s students typically receive Pell. Anticipating that students who may
struggle academically and have high levels of unmet financial need have very little “wiggle
room” for financial or academic shortfalls, the experts concluded a financial variable should be
included that addresses students with high unmet need, while also encompassing academic risk,
an overall need profile, and evidence of financial aid literacy. In a finding contradictory to much
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of the literature, the experts expressed an opinion that students with homes closer to the
institution (particularly within the institution’s metro area) are less likely to retain. Additionally,
noting a commonly expressed reason for leaving during student exit interviews, the experts also
recommended a variable capturing mismatch between a student’s first-year academic advisor and
the student’s expressed program of study interest.
Table 2.4
List of Variables Proposed and Approved by Experts in Structure Elicitation (Elicitation
Session I)
Variable
Operating
Variable Classes
Weight
Quantitative Data
Definition
1=Highest
Availability/Measure
10=Lowest
Study Skills

Financial Need
& Risk Profile

Social Support

Whether or not a
student
demonstrates
good study skills
– successful time
management,
minimal
procrastination,
adequate notetaking and
review, course
engagement, etc.
Encompasses
students’
academic
preparedness,
high financial
need, unmet
need, and
understanding of
financial aid
literacy.
The extent to
which a student
is exposed to
negative or
positive attitudes
towards retention
within their
social network.

Developed
UnderDeveloped

1

Data proxy: Hours
reported spent
studying on
institutional survey
(2011 and later
cohorts only)

High (High
Need/High Risk
Profile)
Low (Low
Need/Low Risk
Profile)

2

Data available.

Positive social
support
Negative social
support

3

Data proxy: Firstyear housing
placement within a
dorm floor with
unusually high firstto second-year
attrition.
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Academic
Support –
Student Access

Academic
Support –
Institutional

Attendance
Patterns

Academic Rank

Race/Ethnicity

Whether or not a
student accessed
academic
support
programming.
Whether or not
an institution
provides more
than a nominal
amount of
academic
support
programming.
Whether or not a
student
consistently
attends
scheduled course
meetings.
Composite index
value to
represent
student’s
academic
preparedness.
Incorporates
high school
quality,
curriculum
quality, high
school academic
record (GPA and
rank) and
standardized test
scores.
Self-reported,
federally-defined
race/ethnicity
categories.

Accessed
Not Accessed

4

Data Not Available.

Very Present
Less Present

5

Data Proxy: Receipt
of grant funding
development of
academic resource
center in 2011.

Consistent attends > 80% of
course meetings
Inconsistent attends < 80% of
course meetings
Lowest
Low
Medium
High
Highest

6

Data not available.

7

Data available.

Underrepresented
minority
International
Other

8

Data available.
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Institutional
Focus on
Retention

Distance from
Home

Advisor/Major
Mismatch

Institution-wide
implementation
of programs,
services, and
resources
designed to
address
retention.
Distance, in
hours, of
institution from
student’s
permanent home
address
Assignment of
academic advisor
belonging to an
academic
department
outside the
student’s
expressed
program of
student interest.

Very Present
Less Present

9

Data proxy: “Less
Present” if student
enrolled before 2011.
“Very Present” if
student enrolled in
2011 or after.

Within one hour
More than one
hour

10

Data available.

Advisor/Major
match
Advisor/Major
mismatch

11

Data available.

Structure elicitation. In preparation for drafting a basic structural model of a retention
BN, experts were next asked to discuss the relationships between and among the chosen list of
variables. Experts were first asked to weight each of the variables in terms of influence on
retention, beginning with strongest and weakest and moving inward from there (see Kjærulff &
Madsen, 2008). These ranks are included in Table 2.4, and were elicited in an effort to introduce
the idea of causal influence to the experts and ultimately be incorporated in the specification of
model parameters and CPTs in development of a final model (Netica allows for the inclusion of
uncertainty using a special case file format). Using the weightings as reference, the researcher
prompted the experts to discuss which variables could be considered direct causes of retention,
and which variables actually influence other variables and should be considered indirect causes
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of retention. The discussions of causal influence were included to provide insight as to the
model’s appropriate structure and variables’ relationships to each other. The researcher also
facilitated discussion of conditional independence, asking experts to consider if a student’s state
on one variable reveals a large amount of information on how this same student might appear in
another variable. Examination of variable dependencies were included in order to aid the
researcher and experts in identifying redundant variables, assure conditional independence
among included variables, and ultimately contribute to model parsimony. As the representation
of uncertainty is a unique feature of BNs, experts were continuously encouraged to express their
uncertainty in any of these discussions. Any instances of high uncertainty were ultimately
included in the specification and evaluation of the final model.
The literature consistently includes training experts as a best practice in expert elicitation,
and in order to provide context and demonstrate the basic components and function of a
predictive BN, the researcher presented the experts with a BN that predicts the likelihood of
coronary artery disease based on a number of symptoms (Figure 2.5). The training BN was used
to provide examples of parent/child nodes, leaf nodes, and conditional independence. Experts
were encouraged to consider the variables influencing retention similarly to the symptoms or
conditions modeled to influence risk of coronary artery disease, and to note the direct and
indirect relationships between symptoms and disease. Additionally, the researcher demonstrated
the dynamic updating capability of a Netica BN, providing an example of the utility and ease in
which a BN can be used to predict retention given certain conditions or new cases.
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female
male

Sex
50.0
50.0
0.5 ± 0.5

Systolic Blood Pressure
63.0
normal
25.0
stage 1
stage 2
7.00
stage 3
5.00
134 ± 34

20 to 45
45 to 55
55 to 65
65 to 75

Age
58.0
18.7
12.3
11.0
43.3 ± 15

Left Ventricular Hypertrophy
present
16.4
absent
83.6
0.164 ± 0.37
Smoking Status
true
25.8
false 74.2
0.258 ± 0.44

Diabetes Mellitus
present 3.10
absent
96.9
0.031 ± 0.17

Coronary Artery Disease
0 to 10
.021
10 to 20
0.18
20 to 30
0.47
30 to 40
0.86
40 to 50
1.42
50 to 60
2.88
60 to 70
5.98
70 to 80
10.8
80 to 90
31.5
90 to 100
45.9
0.85 ± 0.14

HDL Status
0 to 10
.002
10 to 20
.086
20 to 30
1.72
30 to 40
11.2
40 to 50
32.6
50 to 60
35.9
60 to 70
15.8
70 to 80
2.49
80 to 90
0.17
90 to 100 .005
51.1 ± 11

High-density lipoprotein
(HDL) cholesterol is known
as the "good" cholesterol.
Greater than 40mg/dL is
optimal for most people.

Total Cholesterol
100 to 150 3.13
150 to 200 34.5
200 to 250 47.2
250 to 300 4.59
300 to 350 1.76
350 to 400 1.76
400 to 450 1.76
450 to 500 1.76
500 to 550 1.76
550 to 600 1.76
231 ± 87

Figure 2.5. Training BN: Coronary Artery Disease Risk Estimator, Norsys Software Corp.
Bayes Net Library, http://www.norsys.com/netlibrary/index.htm . Copyright 2004 by
Assessment Technologies, Inc.
Finally, the experts were asked to draft a basic structural model of retention incorporating
the variables and the relationships between and among the variables and retention. The
researcher reminded the experts of earlier discussions and decisions regarding causal influence,
conditional independence, and weight in the formation of the structure, and allowed the experts
to collaborate in the design although they ultimately drafted their own versions. Throughout the
drafting process, the researcher verbally articulated scenarios depicted in the structure in order to
ensure that the structure accurately represented the experts’ judgments. A composite of the
experts’ structure designs is provided in Figure 2.6.
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Study Skills
Developed
UnderDeveloped
Race/Ethnicity
Underrepresented
International
Other

Attendance Patterns
Consistent
Inconsistent

Distance from Home
WithinHour
MoreHour

Academic Support - Student Access

Social Support
Positive
Negative

Accessed
DidNotAccess

Financial Need & Risk Profile
Academic Rank

High
Low

Lowest
Low
Medium
High
Highest

Institutional Focus on Retention
LessPresent
MorePresent

Advisor/Major Mismatch
MajorMatch
MajorMismatch

Academic Support - Institutional
MorePresent
LessPresent

Retained
Retained
NotRetained

Figure 2.6. Expert-elicited structural model.
In summary, the expert-elicited structural BN includes twelve nodes. All but one
(“Race/Ethnicity”) are portrayed as direct influences on retention, although five (“Study Skills,”
“Race/Ethnicity”, “Distance from Home,” “Institutional Focus on Retention,” and “Financial
Need & Risk Profile”) are also thought to be influences on other included variables. Table 2.5
summarizes the model’s complexity, which is very similar to the “straw man” BN.
Table 2.5
Expert Elicited Structural Model Complexity Metrics
Metric
Count
Nodes
12
Links
18
Node States
28

Development of interim model. Development of an interim model designed to
incorporate the insights gathered from the original “straw man” data- and structure-learned
model as well as the expert-elicited model involved the comparison and examination of these
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models’ structures, variables, and data-learned parameters. Ultimately, this second model was
designed as an interim stage in preparation of creation of a final model that includes a hybrid of
expert-elicited and data-learned parameters and structure.
Comparison of “straw man” and expert-elicited structural model. Cursory comparison
of the data- and structure-learned “straw man” model and the expert-elicited structural model
revealed few commonalities in included nodes. For example, the experts dismissed the
importance of including distinct nodes for generally accepted proxies for academic preparedness
(high school academic records and standardized test scores) in a model, opining that while the
institution’s students are academically and intellectually prepared, academic success and
retention at the institution is much more dependent on students’ study skills. However, the
experts did endorse the inclusion of a composite variable that incorporates a number of indicators
of academic preparedness (“Academic Rank”), noting that, in addition to having a direct
influence on retention, it is also influenced by study skills. Examination of the links learned in
the “straw man” model support the inclusion of the composite “Academic Rank” variable in a
second model– many of the academic preparedness variables were learned to be related to each
other in the “straw man” model and the combination of them into one variable creates a more
parsimonious model. Expert discussion of demographic variables included in the “straw man”
model revealed experts’ uncertainty of any direct role played by race/ethnicity on retention while
highlighting their belief that race/ethnicity is involved in other important causes of retention.
Hence, this variable was still included in a second model but was not shown to have a direct
influence on retention. Additionally, the “straw man” model included a variable depicting
students’ socioeconomic status as determined by eligibility for Pell grants, and indicated that
socioeconomic status is closely linked with other demographic variables. The experts’ opinion
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that the role of finances is much more complicated than simple socioeconomic status and
ultimate suggestion of a composite financial risk/need variable addresses the confounding and
redundant influence of demographics on retention expressed in the “straw man” model. Finally,
as evaluation of the “straw man” model revealed a relatively weak predictive model with
unaccounted for influences, all other variables suggested by the experts were included in the
interim model under the expectation that the experts’ familiarity with institution-specific factors
is superior to the literature-identified variables on which quantitative data were available that
were used to build the “straw man” model.
Parameterizing interim model. Using Netica, the researcher prepared a second, interim
BN that incorporated the structural insights provided by experts and was parameterized by
available existing data (2009-2011 first-year cohort data). Two of the variables included did not
have associated existing data (“Attendance Patterns” and “Academic Support-Student Access”)
and other variables included numerous missing data. For example, data indicating whether or
not a student exhibits study skills (as measured by responses on an institutional questionnaire)
were only available for students in the 2011 cohort. In order to address these incomplete data,
Netica allows parameter learning via an expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm where
maximum a posteriori parameter estimates are computed using maximization of the expected
log-likelihoods of parameters after a number of iterations (see Dempster, Laird, & Rubin, 1977).
In other words, the EM algorithm is used to maximize the probability of data given the BN’s
structure and CPTs. The resulting model reflected the current state of each of the variables for
which data were available and showed the two unknown variables (“Attendance Patterns” and
“Academic Support – Student Access”) as having uniform prior probability distributions, or
equally likely states. The model also included the data-learned CPTs for each variable when data
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were available. As part of design of a final model, the parameters and associated CPTs were
ultimately presented to the experts in a second elicitation session for review, critique, and
elicitation of the unknown parameters.
Development of final model. Development of the final model included the following
stages: Expert review of the interim model, formal elicitation of unknown parameters,
parameterization of the final model, and evaluation of final model performance.
Expert review of interim model. Expert review of the interim model began with
evaluation of the included variables’ operating definitions. Noting that the two institutional
variables (“Academic Support-Institutional” and “Institutional Focus on Retention”) are
irrelevant for any post-2011 cohorts as both variables served as indicators of a shift in
institutional priority to increasing retention beginning in 2011 and continuing forward, the
experts recommended exclusion of these two variables from any final model. The experts also
discussed the quantification of “consistent” and “inconsistent” attendance patterns, confirming
that attending 80% or more course meetings is appropriately considered “consistent.”
Additionally, the experts considered the “Academic Support-Student Access” variable, focusing
on what activities should be considered “academic support programming” and the frequency at
which student access of such programming would begin to influence retention likelihood.
The researcher next introduced a comparison of the variable influence rankings
established by the experts in the first elicitation session against the rankings suggested by
sensitivity analysis of the data-learned parameters in the second/interim model. The only major
difference in the relative importance suggested by the experts and reflected in the data-learned
parameters of the interim model was the influence of “Academic Rank,” with the data-learned
parameters suggesting retention was more sensitive to academic preparedness than the experts
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anticipated. Discussion of the ranks was included in an effort to gage experts’ uncertainty with
specific variables that would be incorporated into the final model. For example, a conflict
between expert-understood rank and data-learned rank could be addressed and mitigated by
using Netica’s uncertain case file format in development of the final model. The final list of
included variables and their related operating definitions, ranks, variable classes and data sources
are summarized in Table 2.6.
Table 2.6
List of Variables Operationalized and Approved by Experts in Model Review and Parameter
Elicitation Session (Elicitation Session II)
Variable
Operating
Variable Classes
Weight
Quantitative Data
Definition
1=Highest Availability/Measure
10=Lowest
Study Skills
Whether or not a Developed
1
Expert estimations.
student
UnderDeveloped
demonstrates
good study skills
– successful time
management,
minimal
procrastination,
adequate notetaking and
review, course
engagement, etc.
Academic
Composite index Lowest
2
Data available.
Rank
value to
Low
represent
Medium
student’s
High
academic
Highest
preparedness.
Incorporates
high school
quality,
curriculum
quality, high
school academic
record (GPA and
rank) and
standardized test
scores.
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Social Support The extent to
which a student
is exposed to
negative or
positive attitudes
towards
retention within
their social
network.
Financial
Encompasses
Need & Risk
students’
Profile
academic
preparedness,
high financial
need, unmet
need, and
understanding of
financial aid
literacy.
Academic
Whether or not a
Support
student accessed
academic
support
programming.
Academic
support
programming
includes studentinitiated
meetings with
instructors or
attendance at
academic
resource center
programming.
Attendance
Whether or not a
Patterns
student
consistently
attends
scheduled course
meetings.

Positive social
support
Negative social
support

3

Data proxy: Firstyear housing
placement within a
dorm floor with
unusually high firstto second-year
attrition.

High (High
Need/High Risk
Profile)
Low (Low
Need/Low Risk
Profile)

4

Data available.

None
Low – Student
attended at least
one and less than
five self-initiated
meetings with
instructor or other
academic support
programming.
High – Student
attended five or
more self-initiated
meeting with
instructor or
academic support
programming.
Consistent - attends
> 80% of course
meetings
Inconsistent attends < 80% of
course meetings

5

Expert estimation.

6

Expert estimation.
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Distance from
Home

Distance, in
hours, of
institution from
student’s
permanent home
address
Advisor/Major Assignment of
Mismatch
academic
advisor
belonging to an
academic
department
outside the
student’s
expressed
program of
student interest.
Race/Ethnicity Self-reported,
federally-defined
race/ethnicity
categories.

Within one hour
More than one hour

7

Data available.

Advisor/Major
match
Advisor/Major
mismatch

8

Data available.

Underrepresented
minority
International
Other

N/A (no
direct
influence
on
retention)

Data available.

Formal elicitation of conditional probabilities. As noted earlier, two of the variables
included in the interim model did not have associated available quantitative data (“Attendance
Patterns” and “Academic Support”) and one variable deemed particularly important by previous
models and experts (“Study Skills”) contained substantial missing data. Consequently, the
parameters associated with these variables (their conditional probabilities) were elicited from the
two experts using formal and rigorous methodology designed to accurately represent the experts’
knowledge and minimize bias. Elicitation techniques followed the best-practice guidelines
outlined in Kadane and Wolfson (2008) and O’Hagan et al. (2006), and utilized materials and
software from an expert elicitation framework (SHELF: the Sheffield Elicitation Framework
version 2.0) designed by Oakley and O’Hagan (2010). Kadane and Wolfson described a
successful elicitation as one in which the researcher assures the process is “as easy as possible
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for subject-matter experts to tell us what they believe, in probabilistic terms, while reducing how
much they need to know about probability theory to do so” (p. 4), and this idea was used as a
guiding principle throughout the session with the experts.
Prior to the session, the experts were provided with pre-elicitation materials describing
the purpose and objectives of the upcoming elicitation session, as well as a basic probability
review and summary of common causes of bias. The pre-elicitation materials also emphasized
the important role of uncertainty throughout the process. The session began with expert review
of the interim model and its included variables and related operating definitions and rankings
(see earlier discussion), but the majority of the session focused on the elicitation of probabilities.
In order to set the stage for the session’s discussions and ensure experts’ proper understandings
of basic probability theory, the researcher first posed a practice elicitation where a known
probability was elicited (the retention rate for the 2014 cohort) and the experts were asked to
describe what that known probability meant in terms of how many students stay, how many
leave, etc. The expert also posed a known retention scenario involving conditional probability
(the likelihood of retention given Pell-eligibility) to gauge and prompt discussion of experts’
understanding of conditional probabilities. Based on expert responses and explanations, the
researcher determined the experts were prepared to provide estimations of conditional
probabilities for the three variables in question.
In accordance with the SHELF materials and guidance, experts were first asked to
estimate the extreme lower and upper bounds of an overall retention rate, and move inward to
more likely rates from there. Oakley and O’Hagan (2010) posited that this technique mitigates
experts’ overconfidence and encourages experts to consider models outside of what they’re most
familiar. In addition to these extreme lower and upper bounds of overall retention rates, the
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experts provided “medium”, “high,” and “low” estimations of an overall retention rate on which
they would base their judgements throughout the rest of the session. As with all estimations
during the session, the researcher consistently provided feedback (“…given Z, you’re suggesting
that out of X students, Y wouldn’t return the following fall semester…”) and encouraged experts
to express their level of confidence and uncertainty in their conclusions. Additionally, the
researcher remained mindful of incoherence of judgements, and was prepared to ask experts to
account for any such incoherence.
For each variable on which elicitation took place, experts were first asked to estimate the
current state of each variable given no other information. For example, as no data were available
regarding how many students attend courses consistently, experts were first asked to estimate the
percentage of students consistently attending courses. This information was entered into a predesigned spreadsheet containing conditional probability tables and would ultimately be used to
simulate the underlying data distributions used in development of the final model. Experts were
next asked to provide judgements regarding the conditional probabilities for each variable in
question. This topic served as the most intensive in the session, as the number of conditional
probabilities required grew as the relationships between variables grew. For example, based on
the interim model, a full CPT for “Attendance Patterns” involves “Study Skills” and “Retention,”
while a full CPT for “Academic Support” involves “Race/Ethnicity,” “Study Skills,” and
“Retention.” Finally, experts were asked to provide predictions of the probability of retention
given a number of hypothetical variable scenarios, and their responses were later used as a
measure of the final model’s internal validity.
Expert discussion during the conditional probability elicitations revealed a number of
insights related to model. For example, the experts expressed a large amount of uncertainty
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regarding the actual amount of students accessing academic support, but were much more
confident in estimating the role of accessing academic support on retention. The experts also
openly expressed difficulty avoiding availability bias, especially in terms of allowing particularly
memorable student retention scenarios to overpower more typical situations. Additionally, the
experts identified certain probabilistic conditions that, while puzzling to an outside viewer, are
specifically relevant and unique to the institution. For example, given the experts’ conclusion
that students’ study skills exact a heavier influence on likelihood of retention than students’
attendance patterns, once would expect a pattern of probability in which, no matter the level of
attendance, a student with developed study skills is more likely to retain. However, the experts
provided a probability distribution in which students with developed study skills who
inconsistently attend class are less likely to retain than students with underdeveloped study skills
who do consistently attend (see Table 2.7). The experts described this as a situation unique to
the institution, noting that inconsistent course attendance of a student with developed study skills
is an indicator of a larger, more significant problem that will ultimately lessen the likelihood of
retention. It is this type of expert-identified situation that speaks to the value of including expert
opinion in model development. If data surrounding these variables were available, this type of
pattern might be viewed as an anomaly without the experts’ insights. Without data or the
experts’ opinions, this particular situation may never have been recognized or represented in a
model. See Appendix C for more detail concerning probability elicitation techniques and
protocol.
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Table 2.7
Elicited Probability of “Retention” Given “Study Skills” and “Attendance Patterns:” Example of
Unanticipated Probability Patterns
Study Skills
Attendance Patterns
p(Retained)
p(Not Retained)
Developed
Consistent
86%
14%
UnderDeveloped Consistent
83%
17%
Developed
Inconsistent
79%
21%
UnderDeveloped Inconsistent
77%
23%

Parameter estimation. After elicitation and collection of conditional probabilities on the
variables for which no or very little quantitative data were available, the researcher employed a
hybrid approach to parameterization of the final BN’s nodes. All variables and structure
recommended by the experts were maintained in the final model as all of the most influential
variables included in the original “straw man” model were also somehow represented in the
expert-generated design (e.g., standardized test scores are incorporated into “Academic Rank”
variable). Further, the variables recommended by the experts were also found to have theoretical
underpinnings in the larger retention literature. Heretofore unused 2012-2014 cohort data were
used to parameterize seven of the ten nodes for which data were available. Following the
guidance of Woodberry, Nicholson, Korb & Pollino (2005) and Pollino, Woodberry, Nicholson,
Korb, & Hart (2007), data were simulated through Netica to mirror the conditional probabilities
elicited from the experts for the unknown variables and then manually input into the CPTs using
Netica. The final BN incorporating expert-designed structure and a hybrid data-learned/expertlearned approach to parameterization is shown in Figure 2.7. Note that this figure only shows
the current state of each variable – the dynamic and predictive nature of the model is viewed
through Netica when adding new case information.
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Figure 2.7. Final Retention BN. Incorporates hybrid expert- and data-learned construction.
For example, Figure 2.8 demonstrates the effect on predicted retention for a hypothetical
student with low levels of social and academic integration. The student’s degree of social
integration is reflected by her negative standing on “Social Support” and her academic
integration is reflected by inconsistent “Attendance Patterns” and no access of “Academic
Support.” Viewed within the context of Tinto’s model of retention (the degree to which a
student is integrated into an institution’s social and academic framework is positively related to
her likelihood of retention) (Tinto, 1975), this student reflects a high risk of attrition. This is
corroborated by the BN, as predicted retention drops from 83.5% to 74.4%. Table 2.8
summarizes the model’s retention prediction for a number of scenarios within Tinto’s
framework. The final BN suggests that the included population adheres to Tinto’s model in that
higher degrees of academic and social integration lead to higher likelihood of retention.
Additionally, reviewing the final BN’s performance in the context of a commonly accepted and
cited theory of undergraduate retention illustrates the relevance of the model.
138

Figure 2.8. Final Retention BN, Tinto high attrition risk. Hypothetical student demonstrates low
academic integration (inconsistent course attendance and no access to academic support) and low
social integration (negative social support). Under Tinto’s model of retention, this student
represents a high risk of attrition. Note that probability of retention has decreased from 83.5% to
74.4%.

Table 2.8
Retention Effects of Variables Related to Tinto’s Model
Academic Integration
Attendance
Patterns
Consistent
Inconsistent
Consistent
Inconsistent
Consistent
Inconsistent
Consistent
Inconsistent
Consistent
Inconsistent
Consistent
Inconsistent

Academic
Support
High
High
High
High
Low
Low
Low
Low
None
None
None
None

Social
Integration
Social
Support
Positive
Positive
Negative
Negative
Positive
Positive
Negative
Negative
Positive
Positive
Negative
Negative

p(Not Retained)
11.0%
16.8%
13.3%
20.1%
15.6%
25.3%
18.8%
29.6%
14.9%
21.7%
17.9%
25.6%
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p(Retained)
89.0%
83.2%
86.7%
79.9%
84.4%
74.7%
81.2%
70.4%
85.1%
78.3%
82.1%
74.4%

Results
As with the original “straw man” model, 5-fold cross-validation was employed in order to
evaluate the predictive accuracy of the final model. The confusion matrix for the model is
presented in Table 2.9. Over the five folds, the final model predicted likelihood of retention
correctly in 83.5% (592/709) of cases. The model misclassified cases 16.5% of the time. This
measure of overall model performance suggests a more accurate model than the original “straw
man” network. However, a closer look at some of the additional measures of performance that
can be calculated using the confusion matrix (Table 2.10) reveals that the apparent success of the
model is tempered by other factors. For example, while the model’s sensitivity, or true positive
rate, is high at 98% (when a student is actually retained, the model predicts retention 98% of the
time), the model’s specificity or true negative rate (when a student is not actually retained and
the model predicts attrition) suffers at merely 5% (6/116). Similar issues with specificity and
false positive rates were present in the original “straw man” model, and are most likely due to the
highly imbalanced class distribution within the dataset. Within this population, the vast majority
of students typically retain – it is a “rare” event that students do not retain and such imbalanced
datasets lead to model overfit and overstated predictive accuracy (Chawla, 2010). While this
doesn’t negate the usefulness of a model, it does require the consideration of other evaluative
measures.
Table 2.9
Confusion Matrix and Error Rate – Final BN
Predicted
Retained
Not Retained
586
7
110
6

Actual
Retained
Not Retained
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Table 2.10
Common Performance Metrics – Final BN and Original “Straw Man” BN
Metric
Calculation
Final
“straw
BN
man” BN
Accuracy
(TP + TN)/All Cases
83.5%
79.7%
Misclassification
1-Accuracy
16.5%
20.3%
Sensitivity/Recall/True Positive Rate TP/(TP+FN)
98.8%
96.8%
Specificity/True Negative Rate
TN/(FP+TN)
5.2%
3.1%
Fall-out/False Positive Rate
FP/(FP+TN) or 1-Specificity
94.8%
96.9%
Precision/Positive Prediction Value
TP/(TP+FP)
84.2%
81.8%
2
F-value (combined measure of
90.9%
88.6%
1 + 𝛽𝛽 ∗ 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
precision and recall using harmonic
2
𝛽𝛽 ∗ 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
mean)a
Note. TP = True Positive, TN = True Negative, FP = False Positive, FN = False Negative
a
For F-value, see Buckland & Gey (1994), β represents the importance of precision relative to
recall and is typically set to 1.
One such measure is the ROC curve, as it presents transparent information about the
model’s performance in predicting the minority class and is not dependent on class distributions
(Kotsiantis, Kanellopoulos, Pintelas, 2006). Figure 2.9 presents a ROC curve showing the final
BN’s tradeoff between sensitivity and specificity. While the AUC (.62446) is slightly higher
than that found in the “straw man” model, it is still low enough to indicate that the model’s
sensitivity, or ability to correctly predict retention, is only slightly larger than the model’s
inability to correctly predict attrition. In other words, the ROC shows that the model’s true
positive rates are similar to its false positive rates, suggesting that the model is not necessarily
discriminating between retention and non-retention and that it’s simply mirroring the high
prevalence of retention within the underlying data.
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Figure 2.9. Final BN ROC Curve. This figure illustrates the model’s relationship between
sensitivity and specificity (solid line) at different thresholds as compared to an uninformative
model (dashed line).
This is further confirmed with examination of the model’s Cohen’s kappa coefficient (k),
a calculation that incorporates the possibility of chance effects into the measure of agreement
between a model’s prediction and actuality (Rosenfield & Fitzpatrick-Lins, 1986). Cohen’s
kappa coefficient is described Equation 2.3, where P(a) is the proportion of correctly predicted
cases and P(e) represents the hypothetical probability of a chance agreement.
𝑘𝑘 =

𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎) − 𝑃𝑃(𝑒𝑒)
1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑒𝑒)
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(2.3)

The final model’s kappa coefficient equals .062, indicating that classification agreement is most
likely due to chance as there is only 6.2% agreement above what is expected by chance alone. In
other words, there is little difference between the model’s correct prediction and what might be
predicted due to chance alone. Again, this is most likely the result of imbalanced data with a
high prevalence of retention.
An analysis of sensitivity of the “Retained” node to the other predictive nodes (Table
2.11) reveals a substantial amount of uncertainty still unexplained by the final BN. While the
two most influential variables (“Academic Rank” and “Financial Need & Risk Profile”) do
explain away a slightly greater amount of the uncertainty of likelihood of retention (as expressed
in the Mutual Info column) than found in the “straw man” model, it is notable that the total
amount of retention uncertainty explained in the final BN (8.56%) is less than that in the original
“straw man” model (13.04%). However, as explained earlier, the particularly influential
variables included in the “straw man” model (SAT scores) are incorporated into the composite
“Academic Rank” variable in the final BN, suggesting that they are still represented in a
parsimonious model while also allowing room for other variables deemed important by the
experts.
Table 2.11
Sensitivity Analysis of "Retained" to Other Variables Included in Final BN
Variable
Mutual Info
Percent
Academic Rank
.0207
3.21
Financial Need & Risk Profile .0180
2.80
Study Skills
.0059
.91
Attendance Patterns
.0041
.63
Academic Support
.0028
.44
Distance from Home
.0023
.36
Social Support
.0011
.17
Advisor Match/Mismatch
.0003
.04
Race/Ethnicity
.0000
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Variance of Beliefs
.0043
.0037
.0011
.0008
.0005
.0004
.0002
.0000

Examining Table 2.11 also reveals consensus and conflict with the final influence ratings
assigned to the variables by the experts. The model confirms the importance of “Academic
Rank” and “Study Skills” in predicting retention, but places other variables deemed important by
the experts (“Social Support,” “Academic Support”) lower in the scale of influence. Note that
“Race/Ethnicity” was purposely not included as a direct influence on retention, and this is
represented accordingly with zero mutual information. A look at the sensitivity of each
individual node with other nodes (see Appendix D) is also helpful in evaluating the experts’
recommended structure. For example, “Academic Rank” is highly sensitive to “Financial Need
& Risk Profile,” suggesting that the assumption of conditional independence among these two
nodes may need to be further investigated. In another example, while the experts opined that
students’ race/ethnicity influenced both “Academic Support” and “Social Support,” sensitivity
findings of “Race/Ethnicity” to other nodes find that it is merely related to “Academic Support.”
Recommendations to review a model’s sensitivity to changes in informative priors are
also included in the literature (Gill, 2009; Reimherr, Meng, & Nicolae, 2014). Recall that three
of the nodes included in the final model are comprised of expert-elicited probabilities that serve
as the informative prior (“Study Skills,” “Attendance Patterns,” and “Academic Support”). In
order to evaluate the impact of these prior choices, each of these three nodes were set to uniform
probability distributions (indicating equally likely states) and the resulting models were
compared to the final BN in terms of inference. Unsurprisingly, the expert-elicited priors do
heavily influence outcomes predicted by the model. For example, imposing the same Tinto high
attrition scenario as described in Figure 2.8 on a model in which all of the expert-elicited priors
are considered uniform results in predicted probability of retention of 82% compared to 74%
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when using the informative priors. Conceding the importance of these priors on conclusions that
can be drawn from the final model further highlights the importance of careful elicitation.
Table 2.12 summarizes the final model’s complexity measures. The final model is
slightly less complex than the original “straw man” model, and should be considered
parsimonious and not overly complex. This simplicity is advantageous for explaining and
demonstrating the model’s use to various audiences.
Table 2.12
Final BN Model Complexity Metrics
Metric
Count
Nodes
10
Links
15
Node States
25
A final evaluative measure of the final model surrounds examination of its internal
validity as measured by whether or not the model performs as expected by the experts. The
incorporation of expert information in the development of the final BN’s structure as well as
select parameters requires that some evaluation of the model’s capacity to adequately reflect the
experts’ expectations take place. During the second elicitation session experts were asked to
hypothesize the probability of retention given a number of scenarios. The scenarios chosen for
testing were done so based on discussions during both elicitation sessions and focused on expert
indications of important and influential variables or situations unique to retention at the
institution. Comparison of the experts’ predicted retention rates with those resulting from
imposition of the case scenarios on the final model reveals varied results and is summarized in
Table 2.13. Large differences between the experts’ and final BN predictions appear to be a result
to two main factors: Systematic under-prediction by the experts and disagreement between the
variables deemed most influential by the experts and the model. For example, the experts
considered “Financial Need & Risk Profile” to be only mildly influential on retention, while the
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model found it to be a top predictor. The difference between expert and model prediction in
scenario four is due to this disagreement – the model recognizes the large impact of a high
“Financial Need & Risk Profile” on retention, while the experts discounted this influence.
Similarly, differences in the predictions for scenario six reflects the experts’ expectation that
negative “Social Support” heavily influences retention and the model’s estimation that any
impact of negative “Social Support” is greatly outweighed by high “Academic Rank” and
developed “Study Skills.”
Table 2.13
Comparison of Final BN Predictions and Expert-Elicited Predictions of Retention Given
Different Scenarios
Scenario: What is the probability of retention, given:
Expert
Final BN
Prediction Prediction
1. Within an hour, strong academic background, developed study 85%
89%
skills
2. More than an hour, strong academic background, developed
88%
92%
study skills
3. Underdeveloped study skills, moderate academic background, 84%
85.5%
consistent class attendance and positive social support
4. Underdeveloped study skills, low academic rank, high
79%
74.5%
financial need/risk profile
5. Developed study skills, high academic rank, high financial
85%
57%a
need/risk profile
6. Developed study skills, high academic rank, within an hour,
80%
90%
low social support
7. Underdeveloped study skills, low academic rank, within an
79%
80%
hour, low social support
a
Unreliable result due to very few examples of this scenario found in underlying or simulated
data

In summary, cursory measures of predictive accuracy reveal a fairly strong final model.
However, closer examination of other evaluative measures indicate challenges due to imbalanced
training data with a strong prevalence of retention over attrition. The model is particularly weak
in classifying the “rare” cases of attrition, with a high rate of false positive classifications of
retention. In terms of sensitivity, very few of the included variables explain an adequate amount
146

of uncertainty in the model, but those that are most influential were also weighted heavily by the
experts. Issues of the model’s internal validity in terms of agreement with experts’ predictions
center on these same disagreements in expert and model weightings, although some predictions
were very close.
Conclusion
This study was designed to explore two main ideas: Using the literature, data, and expert
information to identify important causal influences on retention, and employing a hybrid dataand expert-learned approach to constructing a Bayesian network that adequately predicts
retention. While the predictive power of the final BN created using a combination of expert
information and data suffers from imbalanced training data, the employment of experts in the
identification, discussion, and quantification of influential retention variables can be considered
successful. Regardless of the research outcomes, both stages of the research revealed that the
process of incorporating expert information into designing models adds a level of insight and
institutional knowledge that might otherwise be unrecognized.
Identification of Retention Variables
The development of a Bayesian network incorporating both expert knowledge and prior
data allows for an individualized model that is specific to the institution, reflecting its student
population, culture, and other characteristics. As Robbins et al. (2004) explained, relying solely
on research literature to guide the choice of variables is limiting as “the research literature ranges
across many psychological and educational content domains, which dampens efforts at
integrating or evaluating the empirical literature…” (p. 262). Combining data and expert
knowledge introduces insights that might otherwise be unrecognized or unacknowledged within
the presence of only one of these sources of information. The experts identified patterns that
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were unique to the institutions (e.g. greater distance from home correlates with higher retention,
students with highly developed study skills and inconsistent course attendance trigger more
significant retention red flags than students with less developed study skills), and were able to
parse among the numerous retention prediction variables found in the literature to suggest a
simple and parsimonious model structure. While data-mining procedures may have ultimately
identified these unexpected patterns, preemptory knowledge of such institution-specific events
allows for more directed and efficient modeling and evaluation.
In future iterations or replications of this research, it is recommended that the elicitation
facilitator be very familiar with the research topic and its coverage within the wider scholarly
literature. Extensive background knowledge on the part of the facilitator helps maintain focus
during discussions with experts, and allows everyone involved in the discussion to speak the
same topical language. It is equally important to spend ample time on collaboratively
developing and finalizing explicit operating definitions for the identified variables. Recognition
of the importance of this might have resulted in fewer changes in the variables’ definitions
between elicitation sessions one and two and redirected valuable discussion time in elicitation
session two from finalizing operating definitions to actual performance of the model (see the
change in “Academic Support” as an example). Finally, it is highly recommended that, given
experts’ and researchers’ limited time and resources, all elicitation sessions be accompanied by
pre-elicitation materials outlining the sessions’ expectations, goals, and even a timed agenda.
Keeping the session on track and focused is critical in producing usable and relevant information
within an often limited timeline.
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Construction and Performance of BNs
The process of model construction revealed a number of insights. In terms of expert
participation, discussions during both elicitation sessions confirmed a high amount of consensus
and agreement among the two experts. For example, comparison of the individually drafted
structures that were ultimately transformed into the expert-elicited structural model exposed
striking agreement between the experts’ understandings of the causal influences and
relationships between retention variables. Similar consensus was found during the probability
elicitations, particularly in terms of expressions of uncertainty and concerns over bias. While
expert solidarity does not necessarily assure expert accuracy or precision, it does provide
reassurance of consistent opinion.
As addressed earlier, the final BN’s performance suffers in terms of identifying and
predicting non-retention. This is particularly troubling considering that it is this specific group
of students, those at risk of not returning, in whom model stakeholders are most interested. This
finding highlights the importance of in-depth model evaluation outside of simple predictive
accuracy. Perhaps due to the capability of BNs to handle scarce data and uncertainty, thus
making evaluation and validation more difficult, many studies involving BNs simply do not
include quantitative model evaluation (Aguilera, Fernández, Fernández, Rumi, & Salmerón,
2011). Without evaluation of the additional metrics described in Table 2.9, the false positive
classification issues resulting from imbalanced dataset would have gone unnoticed and an
inadequate model would be adopted by stakeholders for use in decision-making and intervention.
Finally, model construction confirmed the importance of carefully considering variable
operating definitions and the assignment of underlying data to less-than-certainly defined
variables. For example, analysis of node sensitivity (Table 2.10) revealed conflict between data-
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learned and expert-anticipated importance of certain variables like “Social Support.” This
finding does not unilaterally negate the experts’ opinions that positive or negative social support
plays an important role in influencing retention. Rather, it could simply mean that the data used
to parameterize this variable (whether or not a student lived on a dorm floor that had unusually
high attrition) was not particularly descriptive of or relevant to what experts’ perceive as social
support. Again, this finding emphasizes the importance of comprehensive model evaluation,
including analysis of sensitivity and unexpected results.
Use of a formalized elicitation framework like SHELF proved invaluable to
accomplishing the goals of the probability elicitation session within a limited timeframe.
Additionally, use of a spreadsheet pre-populated with formulas that could be used to quickly
demonstrate the conditional probabilistic impact of elicited distributions on the variables pleased
the experts and allowed them additional opportunities for feedback and revision. As a major
goal of any elicitation of expert information is to assure that the opinions of experts are
communicated and received clearly and accurately, it is recommended that preparation of such
materials and tools be repeated in any future iterations or replications of this research.
Importance of Process
While the final BN includes major limitations concerning its current usefulness for
predicting retention or acting as an early intervention tool, it is important to recognize that the
process of model development can be considered as important as the final model itself. Those
involved in shaping the decisions and policies related to a predicted behavior are required to
formally discuss and articulate influential factors. These formal discussions result in a deeper
understanding of the problem at hand, allowing decision-makers to set future priorities for
resource allocation, data collection, and additional study. In other words, the process of
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reviewing the literature and shaping a model, especially in the first elicitation session, revealed a
large number of variables that the experts think the institution should be tracking. For example,
the experts were confident that whether or not a student accessed academic support programming
affects likelihood of retention. However, the formal structural and probability elicitations
required them to trouble this anecdotal and somewhat vague conclusion and operationally define
and quantify student access to academic support programming and its implications. Further, the
elicitation revealed a lack of quantitative data surrounding an activity that the experts feel is an
important factor in predicting retention. Given their expressed uncertainty about the prevalence
and definition of the “Academic Support” variable, it became clear that collection of quantitative
data related to student access to academic support programming and retention should be initiated
in order to support or negate the expert intuition. Even variables for which data were available
included concerns of whether or not they were the “correct” data for describing a condition (see
earlier discussion of “Social Support”). Any and all formal consideration and discussion of these
types serves to only increase the knowledge-base and awareness of retention issues, thus setting
the stage for even better model construction and utilization.
Limitations and Future Study
A major advantage of the use of BNs is their capacity to adapt to new information. As
cohorts mature and new data are gathered, these data can be added as new cases from which the
model will learn. Parameters can easily be updated given new insights from data or additional
experts, and the model will reflect different predictions given a changing student body and other
new information. Given emphasis on non-cognitive influences found in the most recent retention
literature, particular attention will be paid to inclusion of these types of variables. Future
versions of the model will be re-presented to experts for review and evaluation, as well as
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elicitation of any structural and probabilistic shifts that may arise. Maintaining an open feedback
loop with the experts through model creation, evaluation and refinement is critical, and will be
employed going forward. As recommended by Pollino, Woodberry, Nicholson, Korb, & Hart
(2007), an unaffiliated third party reviewer may be brought in to review and evaluate any future
expert-elicited CPTs.
However, as attrition is already a “rare” event, and may grow even rarer as additional
focus and resources are allocated towards increasing retention, the problems created by such
imbalanced data will not be alleviated. In order to create a more adequate predictive BN, it is
necessary to explore alternatives to traditional training/testing data sets for parameterizing the
variables for which data are available. Future proposed study involves the investigation of
sampling strategies that are designed to mitigate the influences of imbalanced data. A number of
authors review and recommend strategies for handling imbalanced data sets within the context of
classification, ranging from simple over/under-sampling to more complex algorithmic
approaches (Chawla, 2010; Kotsiantis, Kannellopoulos, Pintelas, 2006; Weiss & Provost, 2003),
as well as quantification of the costs of misclassification (Japkowicz & Stephen, 2002; Monard
& Batista, 2002). Comparison of these approaches based on model performance metrics like
those summarized in Table 2.9 are planned for future study.
Additionally, future study will include more model comparison in general. As more data
become available, a comparison of the performance, complexity, and sensitivity of strictly datalearned, strictly expert-informed, and even hybrid constructed models would offer additional
insights into the understanding and reliability of experts, the quality of retention-related data, and
the interaction between both these sources. Metrics of model comparison include Bayesian
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Information Criterion (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978) and Minimum Description Length (MDL)
(Rissanen, 1996).
A further option for future study involves contrasting BN performance and advantages
against those of logistic regression and other forms of discriminant analysis. While logistic
regression is often used as a technique for prediction and classification, the inclusion of experts
without extensive experience in statistical methodology, the transparent depiction of uncertainty,
and the user-friendly graphical and dynamic representation of variable relationships in a BN
called for the exploration of its usefulness in this research. Depending on the type and nature of
the predicted variable, the performance of BNs versus logistic regression is mixed (Ducher et al.,
2013; Schmeits & Kok, 2010). However, simply the act of comparing performance and other
aspects of predictive BNs to logistic regression models offers an opportunity for insights related
to overfitting, missing data, and variable importance that can be helpful in selecting and
defending model choice (Roos, Wettig, Grünwald, Myllmäki, & Tirri, 2005; Tu, 1996).
While the limitations introduced by imbalanced and unavailable training/testing data are
important and encourage further study, it is important to consider that a major contribution of
this study lies within the lessons learned through the process of combining expert and
quantitative data. Initiating and maintaining formal elicitation practices that reinforce focus and
discipline during sessions, allowing experts to quickly view their judgements’ implications, and
prioritizing the development of clear and detailed operating definitions are recommendations
generalizable to other studies formally incorporating expert judgements of any subject-matter.
Additionally, this research stresses importance of complete model evaluation in any context as a
critical step, the exclusion of which could lead to seriously flawed conclusions. Most
importantly, the flexibility and usefulness of a Bayesian networks in the incorporation of unique
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and valuable expert judgement, often minimized or ignored, is highlighted. While data-mining
has its advantages and place within predictive modeling, BNs allow for the combination of both
sources while still transparently accounting for uncertainty in a format that is easily understood
and employed by multiple audiences.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
Table A1
Variables Commonly Cited as Influences on Retention and Examples in the Literature
Broad Category
Predictors
Literature Examples
Student
Race-Ethnicity
Scott , Bailey, & Kienzl, 2006
Characteristics
Webber & Ehrenberg, 2010
(Pre-College)
Pike, Hansen, & Childress, 2014
Gender
Pike, 2013
Scott , Bailey, & Kienzl, 2006
Webber & Ehrenberg, 2010
Socioeconomic
Hosch, 2008
Status/Pell Eligibility
Webber & Ehrenberg, 2010
Pike, Hansen, & Childress, 2014
First Generation
Thayer, 2000
Longwell-Grice & Longwell-Grice,
2008
Soria & Stebleton, 2012
Pre-College
High School GPA
Waugh, Micceri, & Takalkar, 1994
Academic
Adelman, 1999
Records
Fredricks, Blumenfield, & Paris, 2004
ACT, 2010
Standardized Achievement
Kahn & Nauta, 2001
Test Scores
Reason, 2003
Lotkowski, Robbins, & Noeth, 2004
Astin & Oseguera, 2005
Class Rank
Adelman, 1999
Student
Financial Support/Ability to
Titus, 2006
Characteristics
Pay
Astin & Oseguera
(College)
Socioeconomic Status/Pell
Hosch, 2008
Eligibility
Webber & Ehrenberg, 2010
Remediation/Remedial
Roska, Davis, Jaggars, Zeidenberg, &
Courses
Cho, 2009
Scott-Clayton & Rodriguez, 2015
Academic Engagement
Beck & Davidson, 2001
Bowen, Chingos, & McPherson, 2009
Self-Efficacy/Personality
Boulter, 2002
Chemers, Hu, & Garcia, 2001
Tross, Harper, Osher, & Kneidinger,
2000
Study Skills
Robbins, Lauver, Le, Davis, Langley, &
Carlstrom, 2004
Attendance Patterns
Harrington & Fogg, 2009
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First-Year Academic
Performance
Commuter/Boarder

Makuakane-Drechsel & Hagedorn, 2000
Kiser & Price, 2008
Ryan, 2004
Scott , Bailey, & Kienzl, 2006
Hosch, 2008
Bista & Foster, 2011
Bean & Metzner, 1985
Reason, 2003
DeBerard, Spielmans, & Julka, 2004
Wilcox, Winn, & Fyvie-Gauld, 2005
Eckles & Stradley, 2011
Hurtado & Carter, 1997
Winston & Zimmerman, 2004
Hausmann, Schofield, & Woods, 2007
Ryan, 2004
Astin & Oseguera, 2012
Pike, 2013
Gansmer-Topf & Schuh, 2006
Astin & Oseguera, 2012
Ryan, 2004
Oseguera & Rhee, 2009
Pike, 2013
Porter & Swing, 2006
Howard, 2013
Titus, 2004
Astin & Oseguera, 2012
Seidman, 2012
Pike & Graunke, 2015
Ryan, 2004
Pike, 2013
Berger, 2001-2002
Kuh, 2001-2002
Bonous-Hammarth, 2000
Longden, 2006
Oseguera & Rhee, 2009
Berger & Milem, 2000
Titus, 2004
Oseguera & Rhee, 2009

Distance from Home
Full-Time/Part-Time
Social Support

Social
Involvement/Engagement
Institutional
Characteristics

Institutional Control

Institutional Selectivity
Academic Support

First-Year Programs
Institutional Mission

Institution Size
Organizational Behavior
Focus on Retention

Campus Climate
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Appendix B
Structure Elicitation Session Worksheet
Variable

General
Variable
Category

Proposed Operating
Definition

Variable Classes

Causal
Influence
(Retention)

Causal
Influence
(Other
Variables)

Which variables can be
considered direct causes of
retention/attrition? Which
variables are considered
indirect causes of
retention/attrition as they
actually influence other
included variables?

Gender

Student
Self-identified gender
Characteristics
(Pre-College)

Male/Female

Socioeconomic
Status/Pell
Eligibility

Student
Pell eligibility acts as Pell eligible/Not
Characteristics a proxy for
Pell eligible
(Pre-College) socioeconomic status.
Students eligible for
Federal Pell Grants
are considered low
income/high financial
need.
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Conditional
Independence

Variable Weight

Does a
student’s state
on variable X
give you a lot
of information
about how they
might be
represented on
(non-output)
variable Y?

Please rank the
included
variables in
terms of
ultimate
influence on
retention –
identify the
strongest and
weakest and
move inward
from there.

Race-Ethnicity

First
Generation

High School
GPA

Student
Federally-defined
Characteristics race/ethnicity
(Pre-College) categories, as
reported by student
off Common
Application.
Student
Self-reported and
Characteristics defined in Common
(Pre-College) Application as an
individual both of
whose parents did not
complete a
baccalaureate degree,
or, in the case of an
individual who
regularly resided with
and received support
from only one parent,
an individual whose
only such parent did
not complete a
baccalaureate degree.
Academic
High school GPA
Preparation
used to determine
admission eligibility (Pre-College)
this is calculated
from a student's high
school transcript, but
only using certain
courses of interest to
admitting institution.

IPEDS
Race/Ethnicity
Categories

First Generation/
Not First
Generation

0.0-.99
1.0-1.99
2.0-2.99
3.0-4.0
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Standardized
Achievement
Test Scores

ACT or SAT scores
typically used for
admissions decisions.
SAT Scores consist
of Critical Reading,
Math, and Writing
Components. ACT
Composite score
calculated from
scores on English,
Math, Reading, and
Science tests.
Class Rank
Academic
Rank among high
Preparation
school class typically presented as
(Pre-College)
percentile.
Financial
Student
Percent of FAFSASupport/Ability Characteristics determined need met
to Pay
by institution
(College)
Socioeconomic
Status/Pell
Eligibility

Remediation/
Remedial
Courses

Academic
Preparation
(Pre-College)

TBD

TBD

0-50%
51-75%
76-100%

Student
Pell eligibility acts as Pell eligible/Not
Characteristics a proxy for
Pell eligible
(College)
socioeconomic status.
Students eligible for
Federal Pell Grants
are considered low
income/high financial
need.
Student
Elementary courses
Participation/No
Characteristics required as a
n-Participation
prerequisite to
(College)
college-level
coursework.
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Academic
Engagement

Study Skills

Attendance
Patterns

First-Year
Academic
Performance

Commuter/
Boarder

Student
Frequency of:
Characteristics student interaction
with faculty,
(College)
insightful, cocurricular
contribution to class
discussions, synthesis
of coursework.
Student
Activities necessary
Characteristics to organize and
complete school work
(College)
tasks, and prepare for
and take tests,
including time
management, test
taking skills, using
information
resources, taking
notes in class and
interacting with
faculty.
Student
Whether or not a
Characteristics student consistently
attends scheduled
(College)
classes.
Student
Cumulative GPA at
Characteristics the end of first
academic year. Or
(College)
first academic
semester?
Student
Whether or not a
Characteristics student resides in
campus housing
(College)
during first year.

TBD

TBD

Yes = 75% of
classes?

0.0-.99
1.0-1.99
2.0-2.99
3.0-4.0
Yes/No
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Distance from
Home

Student
Distance from
Characteristics students main
family/caregivers.
(College)

Full-Time/PartTime

Student
Full time enrollment
Characteristics indicated by twelve
or more hours during
(College)
both first-year
semesters.
Student
Integration with, and TBD
Characteristics emotional support
received by, friends
(College)
in the first year of
college.
Student
Integration into and
TBD
Characteristics participation in social
activities (college(College)
wide and residential)
that fosters a sense of
belonging.
Institutional
Whether or not an
Private/Public
Characteristics institution is privately
controlled or part of a
public system.

Social Support

Social
Involvement/
Engagement

Institutional
Control

Institutional
Selectivity

0-1 hours
More than 1
hour, less than 2
More than 2
hours, less than
4
More than 4
hours
Full-time/Parttime

Institutional
The level at which
50-65%
Characteristics applying students are 66-75%
typically admitted.
76-100%
More selective
institutions have
lower admission rates
and higher pre182

college academic
admissions
requirements.

Academic
Support

First-Year
Programs

Institutional
Mission

Focus on
Retention

Institutional
The extent to which
Characteristics an institution
provides and
promotes academic
support to first-year
students.
Institutional
Whether or not an
Characteristics institution provides
programming aimed
at first-year students,
and the extent to
which these are
supported, promoted
and sustained.
Institutional
The educational
Characteristics mission of the
institution, as
measured by
persistence goals.
The persistence goals
of a community
college are very
different than those
of a four-year
institution.
Institutional
The extent to which
Characteristics an institution has
prioritized retention,
as measured by
staffing and
programming geared

TBD

Yes/No

Focus on
Persistence/No
Focus on
Persistence

Prioritized
Retention/Not
Prioritized
Retention
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towards increasing
retention and
graduation rates.

Campus
Climate

Institutional
Culture in which
Characteristics students feel valued
and empowered by
campus peers,
faculty, and
administration

Positive Campus
Climate/
Negative
Campus Climate
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Appendix C
Examples of Elicitation Session II Materials & Technique
Appendix C.1 - Pre-Elicitation Materials (Provided One Week Prior to Elicitation Session II)
Elicitation Date/Time: Thursday, December 17, 2015, 9:00 – 11:00 am (Jenn’s Office)
Participants: Jennifer Cannady, Machamma Quinichett, Corey Dunn (facilitator)
Objectives:
1.

Review and critique interim model incorporating proposed structure and variables
from first elicitation session

2.

Obtain probability distributions that represent experts’ experience and uncertainty
about specific variables related to retention (see highlighted variables in attached list
of variables included in model)

3.

Review resulting model specifications

Elicitation of Probabilities Notes:
•

You will not be asked to provide single estimates of probabilities

•

You will be asked to discuss plausible ranges of probabilities for each uncertain
variable, and whether or not some values are more likely than others

•

Uncertainty is part of the process – feel free to express your uncertainty

Common Causes of Bias to Avoid:
•

Availability – easier-to-recall occurrence may incorrectly be deemed more
important or likely.

185

o Example: Notable exceptions, students to whom experts were more
familiar, etc.
•

Representativeness - similarity doesn’t necessarily mean events are
probabilistically related. The conjunction of two events can’t be more probable
than either event separately.
o Example: expert suggesting that the likelihood that a student has unmet
need and is retained is greater than the likelihood that a student has unmet
need.
o Particularly relevant to the elicitation of conditional probabilities

•

Adjustment & Anchoring – experts may calculate probability based on an initial
value

•

Overconfidence

•

Hindsight Bias – experts who have seen sample data may let it influence their
opinion
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Appendix C.2 - Probability Review Provided to Experts (Provided One Week Prior to Elicitation
Session II)

Probability – measure of the likelihood of a random phenomenon or chance behavior.
Describes the long-term proportion with which a certain outcome will occur in situations with
short-term uncertainty.
• Probabilities are numbers between zero and one – the closer it is to one, the more likely
the event is to occur.
• Computing Probability Using the Classical Method:
If an experiment has n equally likely outcomes and if the number of ways that an event E
can occur is m, then the probability of E, P(E), is
number of ways that 𝐸𝐸 can occur
𝑚𝑚
𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸) =
=
number of possible outcomes
𝑛𝑛
Subjective probability of an outcome is probability obtained on the basis of personal judgment.
Experts will be asked to provide estimates of subjective probability.
• Independence – two events E and F are independent if the occurrence of event E in a
probability experiment does not affect the probability of event F.
• Example – obtaining heads on first coin toss has no effect on the likelihood of
obtaining heads on second toss.
• Dependence – two events are dependent if the occurrence of event E in a probability
experiment affects the probability of event F.
• Example – the likelihood of higher career earnings is related to education level.
Conditional Probability – the probability that event F occurs, given that the event E has
occurred
P(F|E) – the probability of event F given event E
• Very important concept in our retention model
Important Rules of Probability
• The probability of any event must be between 0 and 1, inclusive. If we let E denote any
event, then 0 ≤ P(E) ≤ 1.
• The sum of the probabilities of all outcomes must equal 1.
• If E and F are independent events, then P (E and F) = P(E) * P(F) (Multiplication
Rule)
• If E and F are any two events, then
𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸 and 𝐹𝐹)
𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹|𝐸𝐸) =
𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸)
• The probability of event F occurring, given the occurrence of event E, is found by
dividing the probability of E and F by the probability of E. (Conditional Probability
Rule)
• Two events E and F are independent if P(E|F) = P(E) or, equivalently, if P(F|E) = P(F).
(Conditional Independence)
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Appendix C.3 - Probability Elicitation Protocol – “Attendance Patterns” Example

In our earlier session, you indicated that Attendance Patterns are related to Retention, but
are also affected by a student's Study Skills. As of yet, we don't have any data or data proxy to
quantify students' attendance patterns.

First, let's talk about what you think about students’ attendance patterns, given no other
information. We’ve defined attendance of more than 80% of courses as "Consistent." Let’s talk
about how attendance is related to retention - given a student consistently attends courses, what
is the likelihood that they'll retain (given no other knowledge at this point)? What is your level
of confidence in this?

We also talked about how attendance patterns are influenced by study skills - now I'm
going to ask you to think about attendance patterns as the effect and Study Skills as the cause.
Given a student has Developed Study Skills, what is the probability that they will consistently
attend class? What is your confidence in this estimate? Do you think that this influence is strong
or weak?

Now, we need to pull this whole line of influence together - let's talk about the
probability of retention given SS and AP…
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Questions:
Given a student has Developed SS and Consistent AP, what is an estimate of a high/low/medium
probability they'll retain?

Given a student has UnderDeveloped SS and Consistent AP, what is an estimate of a
high/low/medium probability they’ll retain?

Given a student has Developed SS and Inconsistent AP, what is an estimate of a
high/low/medium probability they’ll retain?

Given a student has UnderDeveloped SS and Inconsistent AP, what is an estimate of a
high/low/medium probability they'll retain?

Remember your conclusions about the strong/weak influences on Retention - if you think
that developed study skills are more influential on retention than consistent attendance patterns
(as you indicated in initial session), make sure that the probabilities reflect this.
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Appendix D
Table D1
Final BN Node Sensitivities
Node

Sensitivity of
“Retained” to a
finding at
another node:

Sensitivity of
“Study Skills” to
a finding at
another node:

Mutual Info

Percent

Academic Rank

.02072

3.21

Variance of
Beliefs
.0042552

Financial Need
& Risk Profile
Study Skills

.01804

2.8

.0037342

.00585

.907

.0011329

Attendance
Patterns
Academic
Support
Distance from
Home
Social Support

.00405

.628

.0008366

.00284

.44

.0005185

.00234

.363

.0004477

.00112

.174

.0002162

Advisor/Major
Mismatch
Race/Ethnicity

.00028

.043

.0000524

.00000

0

.0000000

Attendance
Patterns
Academic
Support
Retained

.01431

1.47

.0048639

.01427

1.47

.0047703

.00585

.602

.0019775

Academic Rank

.00018

.0189

.0000612

Financial Need
& Risk Profile
Distance from
Home
Social Support

.00016

.0166

.0000537

.00002

.00199

.0000064

.00001

.000959

.0000031

Advisor/Major
Mismatch

.00000

.000234

.0000008

Race/Ethnicity

.00000

0

.0000000

.01741

1.3

.0045111

Sensitivity of
Academic
“Race/Ethnicity” Support
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to a finding at
another node:

Sensitivity of
“Distance from
Home” to a
finding at
another node:

Sensitivity of
“Attendance
Patterns” to a
finding at
another node:

Social Support

.00000

0

.0000000

Attendance
Patterns
Distance from
Home
Advisor/Major
Mismatch
Academic Rank

.00000

0

.0000000

.00000

0

.0000000

.00000

0

.0000000

.00000

0

.0000000

Study Skills

.00000

0

.0000000

Financial Need
& Risk Profile
Retained

.00000

0

.0000000

.00000

0

.0000000

Retained

.00234

.235

.0008069

Academic Rank

.00007

.00731

.0000250

Social Support

.00007

.00679

.0000232

Financial Need
& Risk Profile
Study Skills

.00006

.00642

.0000219

.00002

.00195

.0000066

Attendance
Patterns
Academic
Support
Advisor/Major
Mismatch
Race/Ethnicity

.00001

.00144

.0000049

.00001

.000892

.0000030

.00000

.00000

.0000003

.00000

0

.000000

Study Skills

.01431

2.4

.0025088

Retained

.00405

.679

.0007532

Academic
Support

.00025

.0415

.0000429

Academic Rank

.00013

.0226

.0000233

Financial Need
& Risk Profile

.00012

.0198

.0000205
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Sensitivity of
“Academic
Support” to a
finding at
another node:

Distance from
Home
Social Support

.00001

.0024

.0000025

.00001

.00115

.0000012

Advisor/Major
Mismatch
Race/Ethnicity

.00000

.000288

.0000003

.00000

0

.000000

Race/Ethnicity

.01741

1.13

.0031333

Study Skills

.01427

.93

.0025795

Retained

.00284

.185

.0003825

Attendance
Patterns
Academic Rank

.00025

.0161

.0000402

.00008

.0055

.0000122

Financial Need
& Risk Profile
Distance from
Home
Social Support

.00007

.00483

.00000107

.00001

.000578

.0000013

.00000

.000274

.0000006

Advisor/Major
Mismatch
Retained

.00000

.000000

.0000002

.00112

.118

.0003647

Distance from
Home
Academic Rank

.00007

.00713

.0000217

.00004

.0037

.0000113

.00003

.00325

.0000099

.00001

.000996

.0000030

.00001

.000728

.0000022

.0000

.000448

.0000014

.0000

.000000

.0000001

.0000

0

.0000000

Financial Need
& Risk Profile
Sensitivity of
“Social Support” Study Skills
to a finding at
Attendance
another node:
Patterns
Academic
Support
Advisor/Major
Mismatch
Race/Ethnicity
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Sensitivity of
“Academic
Rank” to a
finding at
another node:

Sensitivity of
“Financial Need
& Risk Profile”
to a finding at
another node:

Sensitivity of
“Advisor/Major
Mismatch” to a
finding at
another node:

Financial Need
& Risk Profile
Retained

.32327

14.1

.0214356

.02072

.904

.0021506

Study Skills

.00018

.00801

.0000130

Attendance
Patterns
Academic
Support
Distance from
Home
Social Support

.00013

.00587

.0000098

.00008

.00369

.0000058

.00007

.00317

.0000051

.00004

.00153

.0000025

Advisor/Major
Mismatch
Race/Ethnicity

.00001

.000373

.0000006

.0000

0

.0000000

Academic Rank

.32327

39.6

.0734777

Retained

.01804

2.21

.0051425

Study Skills

.00016

.0197

.0000424

Attendance
Patterns
Academic
Support
Distance from
Home
Social Support

.00012

.0145

.0000313

.00007

.00908

.0000194

.00006

.0078

.0000167

.00003

.00376

.0000081

Advisor/Major
Mismatch
Race/Ethnicity

.00001

.000917

.0000020

.0000

0

.0000000

Retained

.00028

.0302

.0000849

Academic Rank

.00001

.000926

.0000026

Financial Need
& Risk Profile
Study Skills

.00001

.000815

.0000023

.00000

.000251

.0000007

Attendance
Patterns

.00000

.000185

.0000005
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Academic
Support
Distance from
Home
Social Support

.00000

.000116

.0000003

.00000

.000000

.0000003

.00000

.000000

.0000001

Race/Ethnicity

.00000

0

.0000000
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